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Note on the photograph on the front page 
This photograph was taken by an unknown Wehrmacht soldier on 10 October 1938 as 
German forces annexed the German speaking Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia in the 
aftermath of the Munich Conference. It first appeared in the Nazi Party propaganda 
newspaper Völkischer Beobachter and since then has constantly been used for both pro and 
anti-Nazi propaganda. Anti-Nazis, before, during and after the Second World War have 
manipulated the image to show the crying woman on the right of the picture, cropping out 
the two other women to paint an idea that this woman has been forced to salute evil, hence 
her tears. This may not be true. It is doubtful that these tears of sorrow, rather these are 
more likely to be tears of relief or even joy. When the Wehrmacht occupied and annexed 
the Sudetenland, hundreds of thousands of Sudeten Germans turned out to show their 
support for the German soldiers and for Adolf Hitler, their Führer, who had returned them 
to their Fatherland and liberated them from Czech ‘oppression’. The Sudeten Germans who 
disagreed with the annexation stayed away from the public celebrations, therefore making 
it doubtful whether this woman ‘cried in misery’ as the caption in the German Federal 
Archives suggests.  
   We will never know what this woman’s true emotions were on that day in October 1938, 
whether she cried at the point of a gun or with a garland of flowers. What we must 
recognise is that her tears have been continuously used as propaganda decades after she 
first wept in some unknown street in Czechoslovakia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Satellites of the Monster” 
 
A year ago the German fifth column tactics had taken the world by surprise – Norway, 
Holland, Belgium and France had fallen, largely owing to these new tactics, to this age  old 
weapon of treachery.1  
 
Every German or Austrian servant, however superficially charming and devoted, is a real and 
grave menace, and we cannot conclude from our experiences in the last war that ‘the enemy 
in our midst’ is no more dangerous than it was then. I have not the least doubt that, when 
the signal is given, as it will scarcely fail to be when Hitler so decides, there will be satellites 
of the monster all over the country who will at once embark on widespread sabotage attacks 
on civilians and the military indiscriminately.2 
 
The above quotes are by General Sir Archibald Wavell and Sir Neville Bland, the UK Ambassador to 
Holland. Together these statements provide an accurate summary of how most of the British 
establishments in the Second World War described the pro-German and pro-Nazi movements and 
organisations that prepped many European countries for conquest by the Wehrmacht.  From 1934 
to 1941 Hitler sought to first expand the borders of the Third Reich, then the borders of the Nazi 
Empire; to achieve this objective he used a host of different tactics available to him. Hitler engaged 
in geopolitical manoeuvrings with Britain and France, he bullied his neighbours with threats of 
violence, he cultivated alliance with Mussolini’s Italy, he exploited opportunities opened to him by 
external factors like the Spanish Civil War or the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, he developed a new 
form of modern fast-moving and seemingly unstoppable warfare in the form of the blitzkrieg and he 
utilised his supporters and sympathisers within other countries to weaken those countries as a 
prelude to invasion, conquest and annexation.  It is these supporters and sympathisers within those 
other countries that will be the topic of this discourse, the infamous German fifth column 
movements. 
Hitler began using his fifth columns to expand the Reich as early as 1934 with the abortive 
Anschluss of Austria in July of that year, not, as Wavell and many other high officials in the British 
state asserted, with the opening of the Second World War. This essay will examine how the Third 
Reich used fifth column movements in Austria in 1934 and 1938, the Sudetenland in 1938, Slovakia 
                                                                 
1
 ‘Broadcast on the Second Anniversary of the Declaration of War, September 3, 1941’, A. Wavell, Speaking 
Generally: Broadcasts, Orders and Addresses in Time of War (1939-1943) (London, 1946), pp. 39-45, p. 42. 
2
 Sir Neville Bland to Antony Eden, ‘Fifth Colum Menace’, 14 May 1940. FO 371/25189.  
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and Danzig in 1939 and Iraq and Iran in 1941 to expand the power and control of the Third Reich 
over the European continent and the Middle East. This essay will study each movement in turn 
chronologically. It will explain how these movements differed wildly from one another in their 
organisation, methodology and resources. Yet they all sought to fulfil a singl e objective; to weaken 
their host countries as a prelude to German conquest, absorption or domination. It is the parasitical 
nature of fifth columns that makes them interesting and provided the motivation for this study, the 
way they grow inside their hosts like a cancer and eat away at them from within is what makes these 
movements so alluring. However before one can examine these fifth column movements it is 
necessary to examine the origins of the term ‘fifth column’ and accurately define what the phrase 
means. 
 
‘Fifth Column’ Origins 
General Emilio Mola, a leading Nationalist general in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is accredited 
with coining the term ‘fifth column’. In  October 1936 he had surrounded Republican-held Madrid 
with four columns of infantry and made a radio broadcast stating that a fifth column of Nationalist 
supporters inside the city would join with his troops as they advanced on Madrid. 3 New York Times 
correspondent William P Carney, who reported the civil war from the Nationalist side, sent back a 
summary of Mola’s broadcast to New York and the term ‘fifth column’ entered the English lexicon 
and quickly caught on after being popularised by Ernest Hemmingway’s play The Fifth Column which 
he wrote in 1938 whilst living in besieged Madrid.4 Yale University linguist and Spanish language 
expert, D.L. Bolinger, described Mola’s term as “a witticism on the lips of a Spanish general,” and 
many Republican propagandists described his use of the phrase with the American journalist as a 
joke.5 Either knowingly or unknowingly Mola’s term became an effective propaganda weapon; it 
pricked the ears of journalists, Nationalist supporters and the Republicans inside the Spanish capital, 
and made the fall of Madrid seem inevitable.6 The term ‘fifth column’ was successful in creating an 
atmosphere of paranoia, distrust and confusion inside the city. It gave the illusion to the defenders 
that there was a larger threat from the Nationalists inside Madrid than there actually was, with most 
reports of fifth column activities in Madrid coming from a terrified and confused population who 
often mistook Nationalist artillery shells fired into the city with fifth column bombings. 7 When the 
Republican propaganda machine called for action against this purported clandestine  organisation 
                                                                 
3
 D. L. Bolinger, ‘Fifth Column Marches On’, American Speech, 19 (1944), pp. 47-49. 
4
 Ibid., p. 48.  
5
 Ibid., p. 47, and J. Ruiz, The ‘Red Terror’ and the Spanish Civil War: Revolutionary Violence in Madrid  (New 
York, 2014), pp. 186-187. 
6
 N.B. In reality his purported fifth column was a failure and the siege of Madrid dragged on until  1939. 
7
 A. Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (London, 1982), p. 133. 
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inside the capital its definition of what the fifth column was and its activities “remained 
characteristically vague” as the Republicans desperately tried to pin down an actual definition of the 
Nationalist Trojan horse.8  
Mola’s ‘fifth column’ was a throwaway sound-bite, yet it breathed life into an abstract 
concept, that there were Nationalist supporters inside Madrid waiting to undermine the Republican 
defenders and open the city up to Mola’s troops. There is no current concrete definition of what a 
fifth column actually is, with most definitions being too vague, incoherent with one another or often 
over-simplified. The first attempt by anyone to define Mola’s fifth column perfectly summarises the 
ambiguous nature of the term and the difficulty in pinning down a precise definition. Dolores 
Ibárruri wrote in the Republican newspaper Mundo Obrero on 3 October 1936 that the fifth column 
was simply “the one that moved in the darkness”.9 The fifth column of Madrid was an indefinable, 
shadowy, sinister movement that sought to undermine the defence of the city and open the gates to 
the Nationalists.  
General Wavell stated that fifth columns were as much a weapon of warfare as riflemen or 
tanks and that people like Rahab of Jericho, Delilah of Gaza and Jael the Kenite were all early fifth 
columnists with the tactic of treachery and internal weakening being used for centuries. 10 As such it 
is time to provide the term ‘fifth column’ a comprehensive definition that fully encompasses the 
variety of fifth column movements and how they manifest themselves.  
 
New Definition 
I would argue that the term ‘fifth column’ be used as an umbrella term for a series of different 
organisations and movements that seek to achieve the same goal, that being the weakening of one 
group to make way for that group’s conquest by another. The term should be applied to groups, 
organisations and movements that fulfil five key criteria. 
First, that a fifth column is the agents of one group (a state, political party, i ntelligence unit, 
etc.), which I shall refer to as the ‘sponsor group’, that operate inside another group, which I shall 
refer to as the ‘host group’. These agents can be supporters, sympathisers or implanted agent 
provocateurs and must operate together in a coordinated and coherent manner. Their organisations 
or movements can be of any shape or size, be it a small clandestine terrorist cell or an open political 
party with mass appeal. 
Second, these organisations or movements can use any means at their disposal to achieve 
their objective of undermining the strength of the host group to benefit the sponsor group. These 
                                                                 
8
 Ruiz, Red Terror, p. 202. 
9
 Quoted in Ruiz, Red Terror, p. 185. 
10
 ‘Ruses and Strategies of War, Issued July 1942’, Wavell, Speaking Generally, pp. 80-83, p. 82. 
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tactics and methods can either be legal or illegal, overt or covert, violent or peaceful ranging from 
political activism, economic sabotage, disseminating propaganda, public disorder, 
counterintelligence, espionage, terrorism, assassinations and armed insurrections.  
Third, fifth columns must gestate over a period of time, operating over several months and 
even years within their host on behalf of their sponsor. For example, if the sponsor were to attack 
the host and drop in paratroopers or intelligence operatives just before the initial invasion, or 
traitors, collaborators and opportunists were to make themselves public to the sponsor group 
around the time of the invasion, they would not be considered fifth columnists. These groups and 
individuals operate and manifest themselves in the short term, whereas a fifth column is a long term 
operation. A notable absence from the case studies of fifth columns in this essay is Vidkun Quisling, 
the Norwegian fascist whose name is now synonymous with treachery. His betrayal of his country 
was an act of immediate collaboration; he saw an opportunity with Nazi Germany in 1940 and seized 
it; his treachery did not have the gestation period that my new definition requires for him to be 
considered a German fifth columnist.11 
Fourth, a central authority within the sponsor group must be in contact with its fifth columns 
inside host groups. This central authority can be a department of state, a branch of military 
command, an intelligence service or even an organisational wing of a political party. Not only must 
this central authority be in contact with its fifth columns but it must coordinate their activities so as 
they can be effectively used in conjunction with other means of expanding the sponsor group’s 
power such as economic, political or military action. The central authority must also sponsor and 
support its fifth columns. It can do this in a variety of different ways , from providing financial 
assistance, equipping them with weapons and equipment, sending trained operatives to assist them 
or externally pressuring the host group to create an environment that allows its fifth columns to 
operate more effectively against their host. 
The fifth and final criteria is that all fifth columns, no matter what methods they use or how 
they manifest themselves, all work to achieve a single objective; to weaken the host group internally 
as a prelude to military action, conquest, occupation or annexation by the sponsor group. A Foreign 
Office memorandum written in May 1940 states that this is the final aim of the German fifth 
columns: 
 
To do everything to help the German forces to occupy the country in question; actual 
sabotage on well-ordered military plans; demoralisation and confusion of public opinion and 
                                                                 
11
 For more on Vidkun Quisling refer to H.F. Dahl, translated by A. Stanton-Ife, Quisling: A Study in Treachery 
(Cambridge, 1999), P.M. Hayes, Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling 1887-1945 (Newton 
Abbot, 1971), O.K. Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (Oxford, 1989). 
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armed forces with a view to breaking the will of the people to resist; causing panic and 
confusion in order to make ordered resistance impossible.12  
 
 I would expand on this early conclusion and argue that a political party undermines the power and 
effectiveness of a ruling government, or a newspaper that encourages disillusionment or disorder, or 
a terrorist cell that assassinates a high ranking general or politician; all work to achieve the same 
objective, to subvert the ability of the host to resist the machinations of the sponsor, rather than this 
very narrow and inflexible definition initially purported by the Foreign Office.  
In this essay the sponsor group is Hitler’s Third Reich and the fifth column movements 
examined over the course of this paper operate within the Austrian Republic, the First and Second 
Czechoslovak Republics, the Free City of Danzig, the Kingdom of Iraq and the Imperial State of Iran, 
each serving as hosts to these notorious instruments of Nazi Germany.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
12
 FO Memorandum, ‘Fifth Column Activities’, 30 May 1940. FO 371/25189. 
Cartoon depicting a German Fifth Column based in South America as a snake preparing to 
devour the world. ‘Uncaptioned’, By Sidney ‘George’ Strube, The Daily Express’, 7 July, 1941. 
Source, A Cartoon History of the Middle East, 
http://mideastcartoonhistory.com/1941To52/1941to52B.html  Accessed 29 October 2015. 
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Historical Context 
 
German fifth columns have so far been encountered in countries where there was a large 
German minority, or where German influence was powerful, and the people were to a 
degree German in origin themselves.13 
 
In regards to the case studies that will be explored in this essay, the above statement is true. In each 
scenario Berlin could exercise influence, power and control through the use of her fifth columns. In 
Austria this was done through the Austrian Nazis, operating initially as a violent network of gangsters 
and terrorists before evolving into a subversive, shadowy political organisation with a more 
moderate nationalist face. In Danzig, Hitler’s fifth column was a wing of the NSDAP itself, operating 
openly and unashamedly publicly working to reincorporate the Free City back into the Reich. The 
SdP presented itself as the indigenous political force of the three and a half million 
Sudetendeutschen (Sudeten Germans) living in the Sudetenland, while in reality acting as Berlin’s 
puppet inside Czechoslovakia, whereas in Slovakia the HSLS actively placed itself at Germany’s 
disposal to achieve their mutual ambitions. In Iraq a cabal of Pan-Arabist, nationalist, pro-German 
and anti-British military officers and politicians willingly acted as Germany’s fifth column, whilst in 
Iran a large German immigrant community, and a Shah who was happy to protect them, provided 
Berlin with a conduit into the heart of the Iranian state. 
To place each case in its historical context one needs to examine the aftermath of the First 
World War and the 1919 Versailles Treaty and the NSDAP’s foreign policy in response to Versailles 
on coming to power. The War saw the defeat and disillusion of the German Kaiserreich and the 
multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, where ethnic Germans (and to a lesser extent Hungarians 
in the case of Austria-Hungary) held dominion over other ethnic-national groups including Czechs, 
Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Slavs and Jews. The victorious Allies carved up the former imperial 
territories between the previously subjugated nationalities into new nations based on American 
President Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination of peoples. Under this principle each 
nationality would govern their own sovereign state and would be free from the political, social and 
economic domination of other nationalities that characterised German and Austro-Hungarian rule. 
On paper the principle of self-determination of peoples looked set to work, until the victors at 
Versailles came to creating workable nation-states in Eastern and Central Europe, where the 
principle of self-determination of peoples had to compromise with more physical and realistic 
factors such as lobbying by the representatives of the nationalities whose states they were trying to 
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create, geographical boundaries, leaving these new states with workable economies and 
administrative institutions, and President Wi lson’s principle that all nations should have access to 
the sea and the very real fear of the victors that Germany could once again become a threat to 
European peace.  
 
Nazi Ideology 
Germans became the largest minority population in Europe with over 7.2 million Germans scattered 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, leaving Germany and Austria as the only German-majority 
countries as a result of the Versailles compromises.14 Nazi ideology began to label the Germans of 
the Reich the Reichsdeutsche and the German minorities scattered through Eastern and Central 
Europe as the Auslandsdeutschen (Foreign Germans). Many of them who had been part of the ruling 
class in the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, now found themselves ruled, and in some cases 
oppressed, by the nationalities they used to rule over.15 It was from these Auslandsdeutschen that 
Germany’s European fifth columns were to draw their strength and supporters in what Sir Nevile 
Henderson called “the advance-guard for a political invasion by their Fatherland.”16  
Versailles stripped Germany of over 13 percent of her territory and 10 percent of her 
population which to the Nazis was a violation of German honour and they argued against the 
principle of self-determination. However Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office, noted, only 3 percent of Germany’s lost populace were German-speakers.17 In 
response to this perceived injustice and slight of national honour the Nazis adopted the idea of 
Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) as a cornerstone of their ideology and foreign policy, 
where they would bring the Deutschesvolk (German people) into a single state based on a shared 
linguistic, racial and national identity of Germanness. This pan-German idea hinged on the notion 
that ethnic Germans owed their allegiance to the Deutschesvolk and not to the individual states that 
they were citizens of, in what Smelser calls Volkstumspolitik (ethnic German politics) which he 
defines as “an intense concern for the welfare of ethnic German groups and an attempt to foster 
close ties between these groups and the Reich German population through social, economic and 
cultural assistance.”18  
To create this Greater Germany, the fifth columns would be employed in a process of 
Gleichschaltung, which has no direct translation into English, but has been defined as a process of 
                                                                 
14
 M. Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London, 2009), p.33. 
15
 Ibid., p.35. 
16
 N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939 (London, 1940), p.60. 
17
 R. Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart (London, 1958), p.222. 
18
 R.M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem: Volkstumspolitik and the Formation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Folkestone, 
1975), p.5. 
Pawns, Provocateurs and Parasites 
 
18 
 
‘satellisation’ by Kindermann and a period of ‘coordination/bringing into line/making the same’ by 
Low.19 Whereby the fifth columns would engage in the political discourse of the states they lived in 
and synchronise their political and economic structures with that of the Reich. The importance the 
Nazis placed on their fifth columns to achieve Volksgemeinschaft can be exemplified in the creation 
of two separate rival organisations to coordinate the Auslandsdeutschen – the Volkdeutscher Rat 
(Ethnic German Council) as part of the German Foreign Ministry and the Auslands Organisation 
(Foreign Organisation) as a department of the NSDAP – each tasked with maintaining 
communications with Auslandsdeutschen all over the world and competing with one another for 
power and funds.20  
The final pillar of Nazi ideology one needs to understand is the Führerprinzip (leadership 
principle), that the word of the Führer was law and an individual’s rel ationship with the Führer 
determined their position within the Nazi hierarchy and their power. Put simply, the closer one was 
to Hitler the more power they had within the NSDAP and the state. In regards to foreign policy and 
fifth columns the effect of the Führerprinzip was two-fold. Firstly, foreign policy could change 
dramatically at Hitler’s will, with Smelser arguing that the Nazis didn’t have an official policy  because 
of this.21 Secondly, because the leadership of a fifth column would be dependent on w ho enjoyed 
Hitler’s favour and its modus operandi on what sort of person that leader was, whether they were 
ruthless fanatics or sombre statesmen, and the objectives Hitler wanted that movement to achieve. 
Due to this ever changing characteristic of Hitler’s rule it can be difficult to pin down an exact and 
concrete foreign agenda. However a report by UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the Cabinet in 
1936 provides an accurate conclusion over Germany’s foreign intentions:  
 
Hitler’s foreign policy may be summed up as the destruction of the [Versailles] peace 
settlement as re-establishment of Germany as the dominant power in Europe. The means by 
which this policy is to be effected are two-fold: (a) Internally through the militarisation of 
the whole nation in all its aspects; (b) externally by economic and territorial expansion so as 
to absorb as far as possible all those of German race who are at present citizens of 
neighbouring States, to acquire new markets for German industry and new fields for German 
emigration, and to obtain control of some of the sources of raw materials at present lacking 
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in Germany. The form and direction of this expansion is the one still doubtful factor in 
Germany’s plans for the future.22 
 
Fifth columns would become a vital asset for Hitler’s expansionist ambitions. 
 
Austria, Danzig, Czechoslovakia, Iraq and Iran 
Austria could probably be described as the least-controversial child born of Versailles. As one of the 
constituent nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire it lost its continental holdings, reducing Austria 
to two-thirds of her German-speaking territories.23 Despite sharing a common German ethnicity, 
language and culture with Austria, Germany was forbidden from uniting with her under Article 80 of 
the Versailles Treaty, so that a united Greater Germany could not pose a threat to the future stability 
of Europe.24 This was further enforced by Article 88 of the Treaty of St Germain which banned 
Austria from seeking political and economic union with Germany. 25 Despite this seemingly valid 
reasoning on the part of the victors to keep Germany and Austria separate, the Nazis made it their 
first and foremost goal in terms of foreign policy. In the second paragraph of the first page of Mein 
Kampf, Hitler, an Austrian by birth who became a German citizen in 1932, called for the Anschluss 
(union) of his former homeland and his adopted one, stating: 
 
German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland. And not indeed on any 
grounds of economic calculation whatsoever…Even if the  union were a matter of economic 
indifference, and even if it were to be disadvantageous from the economic standpoint, still 
ought to take place. People of the same blood should be in the same Reich. 26 
 
For Hitler, the Anschluss of Germany and Austria into a single Greater German Reich was an 
ideological mission. In official publications and speeches the Nazis consistently refer to Austria as 
Deutschösterreich, German-Austria, highlighting the importance they placed on this idea of a Greater 
Germany forged through Anschluss. It was on this principle of Volksgemeinschaft that they 
coordinated their fifth column inside Austria to weaken and cripple the Republic and prepare it for 
absorption in March 1938. 
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Danzig was created out of a paradox at Versailles, where Wilson’s principle of self -
determination came into direct conflict with the principle that Poland should have access to the sea. 
On the Baltic coast Danzig was the only harbour that allowed Polish access to the sea, yet 90 pe rcent 
of the city’s population was German.27 Articles 100 to 108 of the Versailles Treaty laid out the 
compromises of the creation of the Free City of Danzig, where the newly created League of Nations  
(the forerunner of the modern United Nations)  would guarantee the city’s independence from either 
German or Polish interference in its internal affairs. However it would be within the Polish Customs 
Area where Poland would control the communications system, harbour and conduct the city’s 
foreign relations. Article 5 of the 1922 Danzig Constitution further clarified its status as a Free City by 
promising that Danzig would not construct fortifications, manufacture munitions, serve as a military 
or naval base nor raise a standing army, therefore demilitarising the city and placing its protection in 
the hands of the League.28 Despite the efforts to ensure Danzig satisfied Polish demands for sea 
access the city, whilst remaining free of Polish and German interference, remained, as one of the 
authors of Versailles put it, “unquestionably German”.29 The creation of the Free City, and the Polish 
Corridor – which divided East Prussia from the German heartlands – out of the old Kaiserreich was 
described by Sir Maurice Hankey, the British Cabinet Secretary, in 1933 as “galling  to the German 
pride, looks bad on a map, and has never received Germany’s moral ascent.”30 It would be on these 
issues that the Nazi fifth column coalesced and justified their mission to reincorporate Danzig into 
the Reich. 
Czechoslovakia was created out of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, which were 
mainly populated by Czechs, and the provinces of Slovakia of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However 
the new state was not home to just Czechs and Slovaks but also ethnic Germans, Hungarians, 
Ruthenians, Poles and Jews. Where the Czechs constituted just over 51 percent of the total 
population of approximately 14 million yet they dominated the state at every level, in politics, 
administration, economics, finance, the military and education.31 A contentious issue that would 
antagonise both the ethnic Germans living in the Sudetenland region of Bohemia and Moravia, the 
Sudetendeutschen, and the Slovaks in the east, and corral them into becoming Berlin’s pawns. The 
Versailles Committee justified the inclusion of the 3.5 million Sudetendeutsche into Czechoslovakia 
on geographical and strategic grounds, arguing: 
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Bohemia forms a natural region, clearly defined by its fringe of [Sudetes] mountains. The 
mere fact that a German population has established itself in the outlying districts at a 
relatively recent date did not appear to the committee a sufficient reason for depriving 
Bohemia of her natural frontiers… These regions (i.e. reasons of national security) depend 
on geographical considerations. The chain of mountains which surrounds Bohemia 
constitutes a line of defence for the country. To take away this line of mountains would 
place Bohemia at the mercy of Germany.32 
 
The result of this decision was to leave the Sudetendeutsche the single largest ethnic minority group 
in Europe.33 This was made all the more galling for them considering that the Slovaks, agrarian 
peasants with little education and a smaller population of 2.2 million, were given greater 
prominence than the once-ruling Germans in Czechoslovakia.34 Times correspondent Aubrey Leo 
Kennedy even noted that, “it has from the first been ‘The Czechoslovak State’ – never any question 
of a ‘Czechodeutsch State’.”35 
At Versailles the Slovaks had three options open to them. The first was outright 
independence, but considering that the population were mainly uneducated peasants and “almost 
totally lacking an intelligentsia” this was not a viable option.36 Second, federation within Austria-
Hungary, which was an equally unviable and unpopular choice. The only workable scenario  was 
union with the more educated Czechs who had the administrative, economic and technical 
knowledge to govern a functioning state.37 The idea was that the “politically more mature” and 
educated Czechs would administer Slovakia and bring the Slovaks to a standard where they could 
jointly administer the entire state in future.38 However a partnership of two equal parts the new 
Czechoslovak State was not to be; the Czechs alienated the Slovaks just as much as they alienated 
the Sudetendeutschen which was accurately summarised by one British contemporary: 
 
When the Slovaks, it will be recalled, broke away from Hungarian rule, in 1918 and decided 
to make common cause with the Czechs, who were fellow Slavs, they were promised a large 
measure of freedom. But after the organisation of the new state the Czechs developed into 
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something of imperialists. At home they dominated not only the real minorities but also the 
Slovaks.39 
 
The new Czech-dominated state antagonised both Sudetendeutschen and Slovaks. The rise 
to power of the Nazis in Germany provided both groups with a generous and sympathetic sponsor, 
who shared their ambition of a dissolved Czechoslovakia, albeit for ulterior motives. Led by the SdP 
and HSLS, respectively, Hitler had two “willing pawns”, who would act as his fifth column and bring 
about the ruination of Czechoslovakia and consolidate his hold on Central Europe. 40 
The principle of self-determination is one that applied to Europeans, not the peoples of the 
former Ottoman Empire whereby the Ottoman provinces were divided between the British and 
French Empires as League of Nations mandates with Iraq coming under the dominion of the British 
Empire.41 In 1930 Britain’s formal mandate over Iraq ceased with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Iraq 
became a nominally independent Kingdom. However Britain still maintained indirect control over 
the country and was allowed to take control over Iraq’s communication and transportation systems 
when required and maintained two RAF bases, one at Habbaniya near Baghdad and the othe r at 
Shaiba near Basra.42 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty infuriated nationalists and Pan-Arabists, who dreamed of 
creating a single Arab state. It was on this issue that an anti -British movement coalesced and 
provided Germany with her fifth column. 
Germany’s fifth column was a clique of military officers in command of the Iraqi Army led by 
four generals, who termed themselves the Golden Square, who were supported by an anti -British 
faction within the Iraqi parliament and the Pan-Arabist Grand Mufti (Islamic religious scholar) of 
Jerusalem who had incited the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) in Palestine against British rule.43 This anti-
British coalition sought Germany’s assistance in supplanting the pro-British (and some would say 
puppet) government and Berlin was prepared to oblige them (to what extent will be discussed in 
CHAPTER V). It is important to remember that the case of the fifth column in Iraq, and later Iran, 
occurred within the context of the Second World War, whilst the European fifth columns take place 
in the context leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. Traditional German foreign policy, Nazi 
ideology, the demands of wartime, the geographical distance and British determination not to lose 
control of Iraq; all influence how Germany and the Iraqi fifth column cooperated and coordinated 
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against the British, with Germany lacking the open hand in the Middle East that she had enjoyed in 
Europe. 
Iran (or Persia as it was known until 1935) is the only host country examined in this essay 
that was not born out of the First World War and the Versailles Treaties. Persia had long been an 
independent nation and stayed neutral during the First World War; however it had traditionally 
been divided between two spheres of influence, the Russian Empire to the north and the Briti sh 
Empire in India to the south-east, where they both competed for influence over the country. 44 On 
ascending the throne in 1926 the Shah (King) of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi a brutal and greedy ruler by 
all accounts, attempted to dilute British and now Soviet influence in Iran by engaging with Nazi 
Germany, whose distinct anti-Communist, and to an extent anti-British, both impressed and courted 
him.45 
Under Reza Shah’s protection a large German immigrant community, numbering 
approximately 3000 men, women and children, flourished in Iran.46 They occupied key positions in 
Iran’s economy, communications, infrastructure, finance, army and civil administration which the 
British saw as a credible threat to their influence in Iran and the wider war effort. The British  argued 
this German community was a fifth column that wielded huge influence in Iran and was preparing to 
act against British interests and facilitate German penetration into the Middle East: 
 
There can indeed be no doubt, in the view of what has happened in many other countries, 
that these persons will be employed, whenever it may seem to the German Government 
that the appropriate moment has arrived, to create disorder, either in Iran herself or in 
neighbouring countries, with a view to assist the execution of Germany’s military plans.47 
 
As with Iraq, Iran and the German fifth column fall within the paradigm of the Second World War 
and face the same restraining factors as the fifth column in Iraq. 
 
This essay will examine each fifth column movement in turn, exploring how the movements 
were formed, how they were organised, their modus operandi, how they were used by Germany and 
how the British understood them. The fifth columns cited in this essay are by no means the only fifth 
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columns that the Nazis utilised before and during the Second World War.48 The case studies chosen 
are merely the most notable, and, in my opinion, the most interesting examples of German fifth 
column movements. The aim of this discourse is to explore the nature of fifth columns as a tool  of 
diplomacy and a weapon of war within the context of Nazi expansionism, to examine common 
characteristics and the differences between them and how Britain tried to understand these pawns, 
provocateurs and parasites of the Third Reich. 
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CHAPTER I – AUSTRIA 
“Now we are the hammer” 
 
We have been the anvil long enough … Now we are the hammer.49  
 
Declared Hermann Goering in a speech on 8 April 1938 describing the Anschluss; this marked the 
first successful use of a fifth column by the Nazis. The fifth column had been slowly gestating since 
1931, before the Nazis assume power in Berlin in 1933. During the seven years that it was active it 
evolved from a small underground terrorist organisation into a shadowy political force that operated 
under the guise of Austrian nationalism. The impetus of this evolution was the failed putsch of 25 
July 1934 where the Austrian Nazis assassinated the Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. However, due to 
a variety of factors which will be discussed later, they failed to capitalise on this and seize total 
control of the Austrian Government. This chapter will examine the Austrian fifth column in five parts: 
Firstly, the Dollfuss regime from 1933 until  his murder; his alliance with the Fascist Heimwehr (Home 
Guard) and Mussolini’s Italy and relations with the Austrian NSDAP. Secondly the July Putsch of 
1934; the Nazi operation, Berlin’s involvement, Nazi failures and the reactions of the Heimwehr and 
Mussolini. Thirdly the changing international context in the wake of Dollfuss’ assassination and the 
ascension of Kurt von Schuschnigg to Chancellor. Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia (Ethiopia) 
upset the balance of Schuschnigg’s regime, damaged relations with the Heimwehr and saw Austria’s 
foreign allies abandon her as they squabbled between themselves. Fourthly, the reorganisation of 
the Austrian Nazis into Austrian Nationalists, their more sophisticated operation, the July 1936 
Austro-German Agreement and the planned plebiscite of March 1938. Finally, the Anschluss with 
Austria in March 1938, its direct causes and how the fifth column facilitated Germany’s invasion and 
absorption. 
 
The Vaterländische Front 
On 7 March 1933 Chancellor Dollfuss, the leader of the Christian Socialist Party, instituted a semi-
dictatorial regime after the Austrian Parliament dissolved itself over a voting technicality. However 
he lacked the necessary support to consolidate his rule and turned to the pro-Italian fascist 
Heimwehr, and its political wing, the Heimatbloc, led by Prince Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, for 
assistance.50 With the support of the Vienna Heimwehr leader and Vice-Chancellor, Major Emil Fey, 
Starhemberg and Dollfuss formed a “dictatorial triumvirate” that was  able to resist the Nazis and 
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rule Austria.51 Both Dollfuss and Starhemberg opposed union with Germany and enjoyed the support 
of Mussolini, who provided them with finances, weapons and equipment, including 50,000 rifles and 
200 machine guns, to defend against both the Austrian Nazis and the Schutzbund, the militant wing 
of the Socialist Party.52 Dollfuss visited Mussolini in April 1933 to seal the alliance between Austria 
and Italy. Both men were threatened by the new Nazi regime in Berlin and its pan -German 
ideology.53 Mussolini ruled over German-speakers in the northern province of South Tyrol, which 
Italy had gained from Austria-Hungary in the Treaty of Saint-Germain with a population of 250,000 
Germans.54 Mussolini feared that if Hitler annexed Austria he would turn his gaze towards Italy and 
the German areas of Czechoslovakia and supplant Italy as the dominant power in the Danube 
Basin.55 Therefore Mussolini had a vested interest in keeping Dollfuss in power and Austria 
independent, and in return Dollfuss could rely on Italian support against the 100,000 strong German 
Army56 as the Austrian Army was under-equipped and under-manned at 8,000 men.57 With the 
support of Mussolini and the Heimwehr in May 1933 Dollfuss created the Vaterländische Front 
(Fatherland Front) as a fascist umbrella organisation that would be above party politics and would 
have the Heimwehr as its militant wing.58  
Italian support for Dollfuss was conditional on a crackdown on the activities of the Austrian 
NSDAP, which had been becoming increasingly violent and aggressive since the ascension of Hitler to 
power in Berlin, and hoped to repeat the tactics he used in Germany to sweep to power in Austria. 59 
The Gauleiter of the Austrian Nazis was Theo Habict, a Reichsdeutsche sent by Hitler in 1931, who 
Starhemberg described as “an important part in the Nazi terrorist wave and in organising the various 
crimes committed by the Nazis against Austria,” and by Schuschnigg as “the chief planner”. 60 Habict 
oversaw a campaign of bombings of government offices, railways, bridges and public places and the 
shooting of government officials.61 Low describes the initial Nazi tactics as “propaganda, terror and 
general lawlessness”.62 Dollfuss responded and expelled 1,143 Austrians and Germans connected 
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with the NSDAP, including Habict, on 13 June 1933.63 The final straw came on 19 June after the Nazis 
bombed a group of police auxiliaries in Krems, killing one and injuring several others, prompting Fey 
to immediately declare the disillusion of the Austrian NSDAP without consulting his cabinet 
colleagues, making Austria the first country to ban the National Socialist German Workers Party.64 
Fey’s banning of the Austrian NSDAP had a fourfold effect. Firstly, it became apparent to the 
Nazis that they couldn’t simply repeat the methods used to seize power in Germany. Instead it was 
going to require a more intelligent and sophisticated campaign against Dollfuss’ government. 
Fulfilling the role of the sponsor group, Berlin organised for German planes to drop propaganda 
leaflets over Austria encouraging people to refuse to pay taxes and withdraw their money from 
banks. However these were quickly stopped after protests from London, Paris and Rome. 65 Nazis set 
up loudspeakers on the Bavarian-Austrian border and broadcast propaganda messages into Austria, 
Habict launched a radio campaign from his new base in Munich and propaganda leaflets were 
surreptitiously left in Austrian letterboxes.66 This activity came in conjunction with a strategy of 
economic strangulation; Hitler planned to starve Dollfuss of the German tourist revenue, which he 
was heavily reliant on, by implementing a visa fee of 1000 RM on any German who wished to visit 
Austria.67 The effect of the 1000 Mark Blockade was felt immediately, in July 1932 98,000 Germans 
visited Austria; in July 1933 the figure was reduced to only 8 individuals; from 1933-1934 only 70,718 
Germans entered Austria compared to the 750,000 who visited in 1931-1932.68 Hitler compounded 
this with the banning of all Austrian timber, fruit and cattle imports, another lucrative source of 
revenue for Dollfuss.69 This economic and propaganda war was conducted in conjunction with a 
more precise and effective terrorist campaign designed to scare off tourists and discredit Dollfuss’ 
regime. By February 1934 there were approximately 40 bombings a day throughout Austria, with the 
explosives smuggled over the border from Germany.70 Secondly, the Nazis created the Austrian 
Legion in Bavaria out of the Austrian Nazis who had been expelled or fled from Austria. The Legion 
was a detachment of the SA numbering between 18,000 and 25,000 individuals. They were given 
military training and equipment; their purpose was to cross into Austria to carry out a more surgical 
and ruthless terror campaign, disseminate propaganda, and act as reinforcements to an uprising 
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inside Austria by Nazis who went underground instead of fleeing. 71 Kindermann called them 
“professional revolutionaries” and they are a perfect example of how fifth column organisations can 
be utilised by the sponsor group against the host.72 Thirdly, Dollfuss’ regime was increasingly reliant 
on Starhemberg and Mussolini for support, the Heimwehr supplanted the Austrian Army in all but 
name and much depended on the personal relationship between Dollfuss and Starhemberg (and by 
extension Mussolini), something that would save Austria in 1934 but would ultimately be its undoing 
by 1938. Finally the remaining Austrian Nazis became radicalised, as more moderate voices who 
advocated a gentler more subversive approach had fled to Germany. These radicals were headed by 
Doctor Anton Rintelen, the Austrian Minister to Rome, Captain Josef Leopold, the only Gauleiter not 
to flee Austria when the NSDAP was banned, and Otto Gustav Wächter, who advocated an 
immediate violent uprising against the Dollfuss regime before the Heimwehr crushed the remaining 
Nazis.73  
    
July 1934 Putsch 
Despite Berlin’s terrorist, economic and propaganda campaigns against Austria, Dollfuss’ regime held 
firm; a Schutzbund uprising from 12-16 February 1934 was brutally supressed by the Austrian Army 
with the invaluable support of the Heimwehr.74 On 17 February Britain, France and Italy declared 
their support for Austrian independence and on 17 March Dollfuss and Mussolini signed the Rome 
Protocols whereby Italy guaranteed their declaration.75 The Nazis had lost the momentum in Austria. 
Dollfuss had powerful friends at home and abroad who would protect Austria and with the Aus trian 
NSDAP leadership exiled in Germany the remaining Nazis lacked any clear leadership and followed 
their own policies. Pauley summaries that they were spiritually, not politically, loyal to the Hitler 
regime.76 However a struggle for power and the soul of Nazism inside Germany between Ernst 
Röhm, the SA leader, and Hitler would provide a new impetus for the Austrian Nazis.  
On coming to power in 1933 Hitler sought to court the Reichswehr (German Military) and 
the German conservative elite. However Ernst Röhm, the leader of the SA (Brownshirts), believed 
that now the National Revolution had been achieved there needed to be a second Socialist 
Revolution to create a genuine National Socialist State. By 1934 Röhm had turned the SA into a 
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street army of 3 million men and yearned to replace the Reichswehr as the official German Army.77 
With the backing of the Reichswehr and the “less dirty, more cruel” SS (Blackshirts), Hitler purged 
the SA on 30 June and Röhm was summarily executed on 1 July in the Night of the Long Knives after 
declining the opportunity to commit suicide.78 The effect of the massacre was to consolidate Hitler’s 
grip on Germany, as the Reichswehr had thrown their support behind him, the SS, under the 
leadership of Heinrich Himmler, rose in prominence and the SA was reorganised into a political 
organisation instead of a political army.79 The massacre also galvanised the Austrian Nazis; the Night 
of the Long Knives with its quick resort to sudden extreme violence and its quick success gave the 
Austrian Nazis a working model on which to base a putsch against the Dollfuss Government. 80 
The putsch of 25 July 1934 was planned as a lightning strike against the Austrian 
Government in Vienna, which would incapacitate the regime’s ability to coordinate a response  to 
mass Nazi uprisings throughout the provinces. The shock troops of the putsch were to be the SS 
Standarte-89, consisting of ex-soldiers who had been purged from the Austrian Army for their 
membership of the NSDAP, and were part of the Austrian Legion in Bavaria.81 Two targets in Vienna 
were chosen, the Austrian Chancellery Building and national radio station, RAVAG. 82 On 25 July 154 
Standarte-89 men in Austrian police and army uniforms stormed the Chancellery and seized Dollfuss 
and most of the Government hostage. However Defence Minister and Army Chief, General Wilhelm 
Zehner, and Education Minister Kurt von Schuschnigg managed to escape and elude capture, 
allowing the regime to maintain its hold on Austria.83 15 Standarte-89 men also captured RAVAG and 
broadcast one message that Dollfuss had resigned and President Wilhelm Miklas had asked for 
Rintelen to form a new government. After the single broadcast they played music, there was no 
supporting broadcast from Germany and the Austrian police quickly retook RAVAG.84 Starhemberg 
was in Venice at the time of the putsch and issued the following order to the Heimwehr when he 
discovered the Nazis had seized Dollfuss: 
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The entire Heimatschutz is to be called up and be ready for any emergency. Wherever the 
Nazis take action they are to be attacked immediately.85 
 
The Austrian police and army bore the brunt of the fighting in the provinces. However the Heimwehr 
played an integral part in combatting the Nazis in Vienna and supressing the insurrection. 86 Under 
Starhemberg’s leadership, and with his personal financing, the Heimwehr could boast over 50,000 
trained and well-equipped men and were invaluable support for the Austrian security forces. 87 In 
support of his friend Dollfuss, Mussolini mobilised the Alpine Corps and sent 30,000 troops to the 
Brenner Pass on the Austro-Italian border as a warning to Hitler not to intervene on the side of the 
Austrian Nazis. Mussolini sent Starhemberg a telegram saying: 
 
The independence of Austria is a principle for which Italy has fought and for which she will 
continue to fight with even greater determination in more difficult days. 88 
 
With the Heimwehr forces closing in and German reinforcements warded off by the threat of Italian 
intervention the putsch had failed, Dollfuss himself was shot by Standarte-89 man, Otto Planetta, 
whereupon he bled to death and Berlin quickly disowned the Austrian Nazis. 89 After a furious 
Mussolini declared “Hitler is the murderer of Dollfuss” he sent further reinforcements with heavy 
artillery to the Brenner Pass.90 Even after the Vienna putsch had failed Nazi revolts erupted in the 
provinces but were quickly crushed by Heimwehr and Army troops; the Austrian Legion remained 
stationary in Bavaria and inside Austria the SA and SS refused to assist one another afte r the political 
fallout from the Night of the Long Knives.91 On 27 July Berlin denounced the Austrian Nazis as 
extremist SA men angry at the Röhm purge and denied any contact or knowledge of the putsch. 92 
By 28 July the revolt had been quashed and Schuschnigg was appointed Chancellor by Miklas 
with Starhemberg as his deputy.93 The two men had a difficult relationship. When Miklas presided 
over negotiations between the two to form a new government Schuschnigg was given command of 
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the army whereas Starhemberg was in control of the police, symbolising the rebalance of power in 
Austria after Dollfuss’ murder.94 
In his diary Sir Eric Phipps, the UK Ambassador to Berlin, said that Hitler’s failure in Austria 
was down to the “hostility of foreign countries”, principally Italy. It would be the neutralisation of 
this Italian hostility due to Mussolini’s imperial ambitions that was to be Austria’s doom. 95  
 
Changing International Context 
On 27 September 1934 Britain, France and Italy reaffirmed their February commitment to Austrian 
independence which then formed the centrepiece of the 14 April 1935 Stresa Front between them 
with the aim of curtailing Hitler’s imperial ambitions.96 Phipps described the Pact as: 
 
The high water mark in the affairs of the Powers whose hope it is to contain Germany. But, 
as a result of the Ethiopian tensions, these refreshing waters soon receded, and now we can 
only regretfully look up at the distant white line.97 
 
Schuschnigg’s new, and deeply unpopular regime relied exclusively upon Ita lian and Heimwehr 
support for survival and Mussolini’s Abyssinian adventure was set to torpedo the foundations of the 
Austrian regime. Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) on 3 October 1935, with the use of superior 
weapons, aeroplanes and chemical warfare Italy quickly conquered the country by 5 May 1936, 
adding it to their Empire.98 The Second Italo-Abyssinian War had both internal and external 
consequences for Schuschnigg’s regime. Internally, it fractured the Vaterländische Front between 
Starhemberg, who wanted closer ties with Italy, and Schuschnigg, who “never expressed friendship 
for Italy with quite the warmth that Dollfuss had” and preferred reconciliation with Germany. 99 Their 
relationship was strained after Mussolini effectively told Austria in March 1936 that his 
commitments in Abyssinia meant he could not intervene with Germany on Austria’s behalf. 100 In 
what Low called a “last desperate attempt to gain Mussolini’s favour” Starhemberg sent him a 
congratulatory telegram after Italian troops captured the Abyssinian capital of Addis Ababa, 
cementing the Italian conquest.101 Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia had been seen as an act of naked 
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aggression by much of the world and compounded with Schuschnigg attempting to amass power 
within the Vaterländische Front at the expense of the Heimwehr Starhemberg’s position was 
unattainable.102 On 14 May 1936 he resigned as Vice-Chancellor, the Vaterländische Front was 
dissolved and Schuschnigg lost the support of the Heimwehr.103 With the loss of the Heimwehr and 
the effectiveness and loyalty of the Austrian police and army in doubt, due to Nazi infiltration, 
Schuschnigg’s regime now relied entirely on the Stresa Powers to defend Austria’s independence. 104 
Abyssinia divided the Stresa Powers with Britain and France furious at Mussolini’s 
aggression; they began to organise League of Nations sanctions against Italy, which Germany was 
not party to after Hitler withdrew Germany from the League within months of coming to power. 105 
Despite Hitler not forgiving Mussolini for his “sabre-rattling on the Brenner” in 1934 he sympathised 
with his “brother dictator” and lent him tacit support.106 The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War on 17 
July 1936 destroyed any chance of rebuilding the Stresa Front, as Hitler and Mussolini suppo rted 
Franco and the Nationalists whilst Britain and France argued for non-intervention and tried to 
arrange for greater sanctions against Mussolini that only served to further drive him into Germany’s 
open arms.107 In regards to the fifth column, Germany was fulfilling its role as the sponsor, by 
exploiting the fallout from Abyssinia, and then Spain, to create conditions that would allow the 
Austrian Nazis to operate more effectively. Without the support of the Heimwehr and Mussolini, 
Schuschnigg, who according to Sir Nevile Henderson, Phipps’ successor, only enjoyed the confidence 
of 15 percent of the population, was forced to directly negotiate with Hitler in July 1936. 108 
In his memoirs Schuschnigg argues that the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936 was 
his attempt to “normalise” relations as the Stresa Powers had abandoned Austria and left him with 
no choice.109 Hitler agreed to rein in the Austrian Nazis, end their terrorist campaign and recognise 
Austrian independence and refrain from interfering in Austria’s internal affairs; in return 
Schuschnigg would grant a general amnesty to the 17,045 Nazis that languished in Austrian prisons, 
including the leadership of the NSDAP, SA and SS and declare Austria to be a German state and 
follow Germany’s foreign policy.110 The Agreement marks a turn in the strategies and organisation of 
the Austrian fifth column, moving from the violent, gangster-like outfit that had instigated the 1934 
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Putsch, into a more sophisticated, political movement under the guise of Austrian nat ionalism that 
would successfully achieve their aims of Anschluss with Germany. 
 
Austrian Nationalism – Nazism Rebranded 
The failure of the 1934 Putsch taught many Nazis that their previous Austrian policy had been a 
mistake, as it only provoked Italian and global hostility. After the putsch the Austrian SS, SA and the 
Austrian Legion were all publicly dissolved, but they quickly reorganised and rebuilt themselves 
within a matter of months, operating as underground, illegal entities that would return to the 
political mainstream when Hitler decided to make a second attempt.111 As early as December 1935 
Phipps recognised that Berlin would need to be patient; if Austria were to fall to a fifth column it 
would be harder for the rest of the world to justify intervention: 
 
The fact the Austrian question is in cold storage does not mean that Germany has in any way 
renounced her aims. It only means that she intends to realise them less clumsily. At any 
moment, however, events may occur which will bring about a reversion to the more brutal 
methods of the past.112 
 
New leaders of the Austrian fifth column were to come to the forefront as the Austrian Nazis 
reorganised themselves into ‘Austrian Nationalists’. They were spearheaded by Franz von Papen, the 
new German Ambassador to Vienna and Hitler’s former Vice-Chancellor, Arthur Seyss-Inquart and 
Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, two ambitious politicians. Of these three men only von Papen was a 
Reichsdeutsche and, in his capacity as Ambassador, could openly declare himself to be a member of 
the Nazi regime. Churchill noted that his role was to work within the Austrian political system, he 
maintained Austro-German relations and lobbied for the NSDAP to be once again recognised as a 
legal body.113 The other fifth column leaders had to keep their loyalty to the NSDAP a secret and 
publicly declared themselves to be Austrian Nationalists, a paradox noted in Starhemberg’s 
memoirs: 
 
In other countries … the aim of the nationalists is an obvious one: nationalism in these 
countries means service to the country. In Austria, on the other hand, nationalists are 
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working against Austria, for they want to give up Austria and become absorbed into the 
German Reich.114 
 
Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau had to work in the grey area between legality and criminality as 
if their true affiliations were to become known to the Austrian authorities they risked imprisonment, 
deportation or execution. Low argues that the fact that these Nazi frontmen, operated in a public 
and legal manner as Austrian Nationalists meant they were of more use to Hitler than the Nazis who 
operated illegally. Allowing Berlin to maintain an appropriate distance, and level of deniability, from 
them but still retain control and direct their actions.  115 Despite this distancing between Berlin and 
her Austrian pawns it was evident to many that Seyss-Inquart was “the chief Nazi agent” and, as 
Schuschnigg described him, “the loudspeaker for telephoned orders from Berlin”, whilst Glaise -
Horstenau was “nothing but a silent witness” to the Nazi plans. 116 Starhemberg noted that this 
change in Nazi tactics from violence to political undermining represented a greater threat to 
Austrian stability as it was harder to counter, and by not being a visible threat there was nothing for 
the remnants of the Vaterländische Front to galvanise against.117  
Glaise-Horstenau was the first of the closet-Nazis to ascend to Schuschnigg’s cabinet as a 
result of the Austro-German Agreement, an act that Bullock argued was representative of growing 
Nazi influence in Austria after the Heimwehr abandoned Schuschnigg.118 In his memoirs Schuschnigg 
says that Glaise-Horstenau was “an undisputed ‘national’ (Austrian Nationalist) through not a 
National Socialist”, perhaps indicating his own naivety towards his Minister’s political intentions, or 
he was simply a man who became entangled in the Nazi web.119 Low argues that Glaise-Horstenau 
was disappointed with the implementation of an Austro-German Agreement and considered 
resigning in October 1936. However his Nazi handlers convinced him to stay and “continue to play 
his double role.”120 
Seyss-Inquart had previously been a junior member of Dollfuss’ cabinet and in July 1937 
became a State Councillor.121 Like Glaise-Horstenau, Seyss-Inquart was a “bourgeois professional” 
and not a secret member of the NSDAP; he enjoyed the confidence of both Hitler and Schuschnigg, 
making him a valuable asset for Berlin.122 Seyss-Inquart was often publicly at loggerheads with the 
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illegal Nazi leader Captain Leopold (who still remained in Austria), refusing to join the NSDAP and 
therefore submit himself to Leopold’s control; this helped to assure Schuschnigg of his loyalty to 
Austria and not the Nazi cause of a unified German Reich.123 
As Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau worked to cripple the Schuschnigg regime from 
within, the illegal underground NSDAP was effectively under the control of radical Nazis, Captain 
Leopold and Ernst Kaltenbrunner the SS leader, both men took thei r orders from Himmler and were 
firmly under the control of the German SS.124 In his memoirs Schuschnigg describes Leopold and 
Kaltenbrunner as “revolutionary law-breakers”, bent on Anschluss via violence in the style of 1933 in 
Germany, and in turn they were opposed by the “apostles of evolution”, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-
Horstenau and von Papen, who desired a gradual Gleichshaltung of Austria.125 Despite the rivalries 
between the moderates and the radicals, they all worked towards the same goal, Anschluss with 
Germany, something Schuschnigg concludes in his memoirs: 
 
National-Socialism in Austria implied unconditional Hitler discipleship; in spite of internal 
personal rivalries this went far deeper than we were prepared to admit at the time. The 
Austrian Nazi Party had become a Hitler movement.126 
 
Despite agreeing to refrain from interfering in Austria’s internal affairs and reining in the Austrian 
Nazis in the Austro-German Agreement, Hitler continued to coordinate and support his fifth column 
and apply pressure on Schuschnigg, and called for a plebiscite to settle the Anschluss question.127 
Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau advocated for Schuschnigg to personally meet with Hitler in 
Germany, arguing that such a meeting would help to end any unfortunate confusion between Berlin 
and Vienna and ease tensions.128 Schuschnigg agreed to an invitation by Hitler and travelled to 
Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, a move which Henderson described as a mistake on his part as 
it undermined his authority and gave credence to the Nazi cause.129 Schuschnigg defended his 
actions saying that he feared “being reproached by international, and particularly British, opinion for 
having brushed aside a conciliatory gesture by Germany.”130 The Berchtesgaden meeting between 
Hitler and Schuschnigg was “blackmail amounting to aggression” which Schuschnigg described as 
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“the worst day of his life” on returning to Vienna.131 Under the threat of a German invasion of 
Austria Schuschnigg was forced to agree to the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Interior Minister, 
effectively handing control of the Austrian police to the NSDAP, Glaise -Horstenau remained in the 
cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, and the NSDAP was to be legalised with a general amnesty for 
all Austrian Nazis.132 
In April 1937, before leaving Berlin to take up his post as Ambassador to Paris, Phipps 
confided in his diary that Germany’s increasing power, due to Hitler’s massive rearmament 
programme, would draw many Austrians into the Nazi fold.133 This turned out to be true. Following 
the Berchtesgaden Agreement the fifth column showed their true colours and the full extent of their 
power in Austria. On his appointment as Interior Minister Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin and met with 
Himmler and other high-ranking Nazi leaders; he returned with NSDAP staff and permitted the 
displaying of the swastika, regardless of Schuschnigg’s objections. 134 In his diary on 5 March 1938 
Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, wrote of this sudden Nazification of Austria: 
 
[News from Austria] gets worse and worse – in Styria the Nazis are in control of everything, 
the streets and barracks. In the other provinces they are making rapid progress. People are 
beginning to talk of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, with the specific task of digging the grave of 
Austria’s independence.135 
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There were reports of uniformed SS men appearing on the streets of Linz and in an extremely short 
space of time Austria was rapidly falling under the control of Seyss-Inquart and the NSDAP who took 
their orders from Berlin.136 Schuschnigg needed to regain the momentum and secure his position. 
Without consulting his cabinet, which contained Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, he threw down 
the gauntlet to Hitler on 9 March 1938 with a speech at Innsbruck.137 Schuschnigg announced that 
on 13 March all Austrians, male and female, over the age of twenty-four, would vote in a plebiscite 
on the future of the Republic; either Austria would remain independent or it would join Germany. 138 
Schuschnigg argues that the plebiscite would “clarify the situation internally and externally and put 
an end to Germany’s double game.”139 In his diary Oliver Harvey, Anthony Eden’s private secretary, 
wrote of Schuschnigg’s decision “it looks as if we might be in for a Nazi putsch there now, which ever 
way the vote goes.”140 
 
March 1938 Anschluss 
In his memoirs Anthony Eden remarked that the proposed plebiscite was “the principles of self -
determination … being neatly used to turn the tables against Hitler”: if the Austrian people roundly 
rejected Anschluss with Germany then Hitler would have to stay his hand.141 This was something 
Hitler could not risk, Anschluss was the cornerstone of Nazi foreign policy and would be the first step 
towards creating a Greater German Reich and a continental empire in Eastern Europe. If he failed in 
Austria he would look weak both at home and abroad and his enemies would begin preparing to 
manoeuver against him. Thus he had to kill the plebiscite in its crib and move against Austria before 
his opponents could galvanise and interpose on Austria’s behalf. With Italy now an ally of Germany 
after signing the Anti-Comintern Pact on 6 November 1937, only British and French intervention 
could save Austria.142 Starhemberg warned Schuschnigg that they couldn’t expect the British or 
French to come to the rescue as Mussolini’s actions in Abyssinia and Spain had destroyed a united 
Stresa Front, which would have been able to curtail Hitler’s actions. 143 In his memoirs Schuschnigg 
admitted that Austria’s defences were based entirely on the assumption that foreign powers would 
come to her assistance like they did in 1934, but by 1938 Austria was alone.144 
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When Mussolini was informed of the decision to hold a plebiscite he remarked that it was “a 
bomb which would surely burst in Schuschnigg’s own hand”; the proposed vote would lead to 
violence and unrest in Austria that would justify German intervention. 145 A wave of bombings, 
shootings and disorder swept through Austria as the Nazis, under the direction of Berlin, created 
chaos. On 10 March Hitler ordered General Fedor von Bock to mobilise the Wehrmacht and prepare 
to invade Austria.146 
Schuschnigg first learnt of Hitler’s mobilisation order at 5.30 a.m. on 11 March, when the 
Vienna Police Headquarters informed him that the Austro-German border had been closed and rail 
links with Germany had been cut, shortly after the Austrian Consul in Munich messaged with the 
news that the Wehrmacht was heading towards the Austrian border.147 A few hours later Seyss-
Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau presented Schuschnigg with an ultimatum to cancel the plebiscite. 
Otherwise the Nazis would run riot during the polls that would justify German intervention.148 Seyss-
Inquart had been in telephone contact with Herman Goring, with the Luftwaffe leader pulling the 
strings from Berlin, and informed Schuschnigg that if Goring did not receive a reply from Seyss-
Inquart then it would be assumed he was being hindered and Berlin would respond violently. 149 
Schuschnigg replied to Goring, via Seyss-Inquart, that he would cancel the plebiscite if the Nazis 
agreed to keep the peace.150 Berlin rejected the proposal and issued a fresh ultimatum; Schuschnigg 
would resign, Seyss-Inquart would succeed him as Chancellor, a new NSDAP government would be 
formed and the Austrian Legion would be allowed to return to keep order in Vienna. 151 The reformed 
Austrian Legion had been demilitarised (like the rest of the SA after the Night of the Long Knives) 
and transformed into a civil army of administrators and officials that would supplant the Austrian 
civil service and run the country on the principles of Gleichshaltung.152 
In the face of increasing violence both internally and externally Schuschnigg and his 
government resigned. At 8 p.m. Schuschnigg broadcast the following message over the radio:  
 
The German government today handed to President Miklas an ultimatum with a time limit 
attached, ordering him to nominate as Chancellor a person to be designated by the German 
government and to appoint members of a cabinet on the orders of the German government; 
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otherwise German troops would invade Austria … President Miklas asks me to tell the 
people of Austria that we have yielded to force.153 
 
Seyss-Inquart ascended to the Chancellorship, with Glaise-Horstenau as his Vice-Chancellor, and on 
13 March publicly invited the Wehrmacht to enter Austria under the pretext of restoring order and 
annex Austria into the Reich as the province of Ostmark (Eastern March).  
Seyss-Inquart formally joined the NSDAP on the day became the new Reichstatthalter (Reich 
Governor). Henderson later remarked that his new position was a vague non-entity and predicted 
that now he had served his purpose to the Nazi cause he would soon fall back into obscurity. 154 
Kaltenbrunner was promoted to SS-Brigadefuhrer and made High SS and Police Leader for Austria, 
where he set about reorganising the police force into an instrument of suppression and presided 
over a vicious purge of the remnants of Schuschnigg’s regime.155 “Nazi vengeance does not forget” 
noted the UK Consul in Vienna as the Nazis arrested, imprisoned and e xecuted key figures in the 
Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes; General Zehner and Major Fey, who both played key roles in 
crushing the 1934 Putsch, committed suicide, with Fey shooting his wife and son before himself. 156 
The precise circumstances of their deaths, and the spate of suicides throughout the country, are 
unknown. However there is evidence that they were coerced by vengeful Nazis into killing 
themselves. Zehner’s wife reported that the police officer who  arrived at their house after the 
General’s death said that this was the fifteenth suspicious suicide that he had dealt with since the 
Anschluss and that it must be kept secret; “otherwise people will say that things are as bad here as 
in Moscow.”157  
 
Overview 
Starhemberg, who escaped to Switzerland after the Anschluss, described Hitler’s annexation as “the 
brutal conquest of Austria already undermined by Hitler’s machinations.”158 Without doubt the fifth 
column played an integral role in the Anschluss. Yet we will never know the true extent of the fifth 
column’s size. On 10 April 1938 the Nazis held a plebiscite in Austria to legitimise their actions; the 
vote passed with 99.75 percent of Austrians in favour.159 No one can seriously imply that this result 
reflected the genuine level of support for the Nazis or how many Austrians were part of the fifth 
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column as members of the SS, SA, Austrian Legion and NSDAP. Without doubt thousands of 
Austrians worked to weaken the Republic from within and key figures like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-
Horstenau acted as the main perpetrators. To quote Starhemberg: 
 
“The Nazi Fifth Column, while sowing suspicion and disintegration and undermining 
confidence in Austria and the Austrian Government, managed to more and more to make 
Schuschnigg its tool, mainly through the agency of persons who were often unaware of the 
use to which they were being put.”160 
 
Using means of political subversion backed by threat of violence the Anschluss proved that fifth 
columns were an effective means of territorial and political expansion. Pauley argued that the secret 
to their success was “pledging their allegiance to a common ideology”, an argument I concur with. 161 
Germany was now the hammer and Berlin would use fifth columns throughout Europe and the 
Middle East to cripple their opponents and prep them for invasion and conquest. 
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CHAPTER II – SUDETENLAND 
“Beside an open grave” 
 
The Prague leaders are now reaping the consequences of their twenty years of anti -German 
home and foreign policy. They have disregarded all warnings whether from the 
Sudetendeutsch, Slovaks, or Hungarians and have tried to preserve the fiction of a Czech 
national State as long as possible, in reliance on the one-sided distribution of powers in 
Europe. Prague now stands beside an open grave in which all hope of the maintenance of 
the Versailles system must be buried.162 
 
Völkischer Beobachter, the official NSDAP newspaper, declared on 24 March 1938 eleven days after 
the Austrian Anschluss as Berlin turned its sights towards the 3.5 million Sudetendeutsche, that lived 
on the western fringes of Czechoslovakia, in an area termed the Sudetenland. Hitler and the Nazis 
considered Czechoslovakia as an artificial construct of Versailles where the Czechs were given 
dominion over Germans, Slovaks, Poles and Hungarians and they made no secret of their desire to 
dismantle the Czechoslovak State.163 However Czechoslovakia was an incredibly powerful state with 
strong international alliances and a modern well-equipped army; it was not going to be as easy to 
threaten and bully as Austria. Instead Berlin would have to play a more intelligent game and work to 
severely weaken Czechoslovakia from within before she revealed her hand. The Sudetendeutsche 
were to be one of her fifth columns inside Czechoslovakia, under the façade of the 
Sudetendeutschen Partei (SdP) led by Konrad Henlein.164 This chapter will examine the 
Sudetendeutsche fifth column in four sections: First the power of the Czechoslovak State, its foreign 
alliances and its military might. Second, the formation of the SdP by Henlein and its operation  inside 
Czechoslovakia before the Austrian Anschluss. Third, the SdP after the Anschluss; how it began to 
flex its political muscle and increase its power within Czechoslovakia. Finally, the internationalisation 
of the Sudetenland issue, from the Eger Incident of 20 May 1938 to the Munich Agreement of 30 
September 1938 which resulted in the German annexation of the Sudetenland.  
 
Czechoslovak Power 
Czechoslovakia was a key player in a string of European alliances that were established in the wake 
of the First World War to act as collective security against the potential of a resurgent and aggressive 
Germany. The first of these international alliances was the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, 
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Romania and Yugoslavia formed in 1921 with the encouragement of  the French. The original 
intention of this alliance was to counter any attempt at a restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy or a 
reincarnated Austro-Hungarian Empire in these former Imperial territories.165 Together the Little 
Entente formed a regional power bloc in Central and South-Eastern Europe that would be able to 
balance out the power of Fascist Italy and the USSR (established in October 1922 after the March on 
Rome and December 1922 after the end of the Russian Civil War respectively), and ensure these 
countries independence. The rise of Hitler and the rearming of Germany saw this alliance 
increasingly strained as Germany sought economic domination in South-Eastern Europe and new 
markets for its manufactured goods, foodstuffs and raw materials for its re armament programme.166 
Eduard Benes, the Czechoslovak President, said as much to Basil Newton, the UK Minister to Prague, 
believing that Germany had greater ambitions in South-Eastern Europe and that Czechoslovakia was 
an obstacle and a step towards achieving those ambitions.167 British MP Victor Cazalet remarked that 
the Little Entente was only effective regarding the pre-Nazi, disarmed Germany that was born from 
Versailles, when Hitler began his rearmament programme and Germany’s strength grew the Little 
Entente began to fracture as the constituent members had to readjust to this new reality. 168 
Czechoslovakia was also allied with France via the 16 October 1925 Franco-Czechoslovak 
Treaty, which was part of the Locarno Treaties of that year. The Treaty saw both countries pledge 
mutual assistance to one another in the event of a future conflict with Germany. 169 Czechoslovakia 
also signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR on 16 May 1936, completing a web of 
continental alliances with the aim of containing Germany. As a result of these alliances the Nazis 
considered Czechoslovakia to be the cornerstone of an anti-German bloc that would need to be 
remedied.170 Czechoslovakia was also in a geographically valuable position which Benes described as 
a “salient into the heart of the new German Reich”.171 For the Germans this was intolerable; 
Czechoslovakia stuck into her eastern flank and her alliance with Moscow gave “Bolshevism a 
jumping off platform in Central Europe”, to Berlin this was a serious and tangible threat by the Soviet 
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Union and they were desperate to quash the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance.172 Konstantin von 
Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, remarked to Henderson on 11 September 1937 in 
Nuremberg that German-Czechoslovak tensions over the Sudetenland could only be reconciled if 
Prague detached itself from Moscow.173 William Strang, head of the FO’s Central Department, also 
noted that Czechoslovakia’s geographical position made it an obvious obstacle to the creation of a 
Greater Germany with Austria as the main road from Berlin to Vienna ran through Prague, although 
no one in Berlin publicly aired this thought.174 Newton later noted that with the incorporation of the 
Sudetenland into the Reich this situation would be rectified immediately. 175 
Militarily Czechoslovakia was also a powerful nation with a secure economic and financial 
base to support her military power. The Sudetes mountains and a network of fortifications protected 
her western flank from German designs with Benes declaring that Czechoslovakia was a “European 
fortress”.176 The Czech air force was being expanded to 1,000 aircraft by August 1938 and Prague 
boasted a standing army of 1 million men with high morale and supplied with modern military 
equipment from the USSR.177 The Skoda Works, situated in the Sudeten city of Pilsen, also produced 
huge quantities of modern munitions that supplied the Czechoslovak army.178 
Within this powerful Czech-dominated state, 3.5 million Sudetendeutsche lived in three 
separate and distinct districts around the Sudeten Mountains, who believed that they were second -
class citizens, denied the right to self-determination, in an alien and artificial state. The majority of 
the Reichsdeutsche had no real love for their Sudeten cousins. However the Nazis saw them as a 
useful pawn in dismantling this incredibly powerful Czechoslovak State. To quote Strang:  
 
The Reich Germans rather despise the Sudeten Germans as inferior members of their race. 
They are using the Sudeten German question as an instrument of policy, to strengthen their 
political and military position. They want in the first place to expel the Soviet Union from 
Central Europe and, indeed, to deny the use of Czechoslovak territory to any other great 
power.179 
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The Sudetendeutsche, Konrad Henlein and the SdP 
The first Nazi Party was formed by the Sudetendeutsche in May 1918 as the German National 
Socialist Workers Party, DNSAP, and was independent from the German NSDAP that was formed in 
February 1920.180 When the NSDAP came to power in Berlin the DNSAP leadership realised that 
Prague was manoeuvring against them, as they preached a brand of Sudeten nationalism and pan-
Germanism and had links with the NSDAP. To pre-empt the Czechs the DNSAP dissolved itself on 28 
September 1933 and its leaders fled to Germany.181 This left a power vacuum among the 
Sudetendeutsche who continued to hold the ideals of the DNSAP. On 1 October 1933 a new 
organisation was founded by former gymnast Konrad Henlein, the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront. 
The SHF absorbed many former DNSAP members yet the leadership publicly distanced themselves 
from the ideals of Nazism and instead professed Sudeten nationalism, demanding greater autonomy 
within Czechoslovakia for the Sudetendeutsche. Throughout their lifespan as the SHF, later the SdP, 
the movement’s political leadership denied that they were a subsidiary or affiliate of the NSDAP and 
never recieved or requested orders from Berlin.182 
In his memoirs Eden claimed that Henlein’s movement was a Nazi organisation subsidised 
from Berlin on the outset with the aim of “building a Trojan horse by means of which the Nazis 
would penetrate and destroy the citadel.”183 Vansittart claimed that the “dreary gymnast”, Henlein, 
was personally paid 150,000 RM a month by the NSDAP.184 However Smelser argues that the 
SHF/SdP was not originally envisioned as a Nazi fifth column, and instead evolved into one as the 
result of political struggles in Germany and Czechoslovakia following the ascendency of Hitler. 185 
Evidence of this can be found in a speech Henlein gave on 9 September 1934 where he stated that 
he was against fascism and the Nazis and instead made overtures to other Sudetendeutsche and 
conservative Czech parties.186 It was not until after the SHF was reorganised into the SdP, to contest 
the May 1935 parliamentary elections, and former DNSAP leader Karl Hermann Frank was appointed 
Henlein’s deputy that the SdP began to increasingly lock-step with the NSDAP.187 Henlein sought to 
create a broad movement, whereas Frank wanted to resurrect the DNSAP. Both men attracted 
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supporters to the organisation and in the elections of 19 May 1935 the SdP received 1.25 million 
votes with sixty percent of Sudetendeutschen voting for the SdP.188 
In the Czechoslovak parliament the SdP Deputies brought forwards bills that would call for 
Czechoslovakia’s constituent nationalities to be registered in racial associations that would represent 
each nationality’s interests.189 Membership of these racial associations would be compulsory for all 
Czechoslovak citizens, and each association would have its own services, e.g. German schools for 
Germans and Czech schools for Czechs. However employers would not be able to discriminate 
against individuals based on their membership of their racial association, especially in the 
administrative and security services.190 The SdP argued that Czech officials, police and gendarmeries 
maintained a foreign regime of an alien race in the Sudeten districts and instead called for Sudeten 
Germans to fulfil these roles.191 The SdP also argued that as Sudeten Germans made up twenty-two 
percent of the Czechoslovak population then this proportion of the posts in Prague’s central 
government departments should be reserved for Sudeten Germans.192 To many Sudetendeutsche 
these were fair arguments, as it would halt the Czech-bias against them, and it drew greater support 
for the SdP. On 18 October 1937 Henlein called for “self -administration and the performance of 
complete and executive functions by Germans in the German area” meaning autonomy for the 
Sudetenland within the Czechoslovak State, not apart from it.193 
In February 1938 Goring remarked to George Ward Price, the Daily Mail’s foreign 
correspondent, that German policy towards the Sudetenland was gradual Nazification with the 
ultimate eventual aim of incorporation.194 However this policy of gradual Gleichshaltung was 
abandoned in the wake of the Austrian Anschluss, when, fresh off his victory, Hitler turned his 
attention towards the Sudetenland in what Henderson called “the next definite item of Hitler’s 
foreign policy.”195 The Nazis quickly immersed themselves in Sudetendeutsche politics and threw 
their full support behind the SdP transforming them into a fifth column movement. Following their 
failure to comprehend the Austrian fifth column, the British establishment began to understand how 
the Nazis exploited German minorities, with The Times’ assistant foreign correspondent, Aubrey Leo 
Kennedy, remarking in a report to the Foreign Office: 
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Nazi technique excels at using [German] minorities as advance guards of a policy of 
penetration and expansion.196 
 
Austrian Anschluss – SdP Galvanised 
The speed of the Anschluss caught Britain, and many others, off guard with foreign capitals 
desperately trying to understand why Austria fell so quickly and definitively to the Germans. Many 
Western officials, and even high ranking Nazis like Goring, believed that Berlin wouldn’t make any 
further foreign policy manoeuvres regarding the Sudetenland until the autumn of 1938 when Austria 
has been “digested” into the Reich.197 However the Anschluss electrified Auslandsdeutsche across 
Europe and the Sudetendeutsche were no exception. Within days the propaganda machine of the 
SdP was moving away from calls for autonomy inside Czechoslovakia towards succession and 
incorporation into Grossdeutscheland.198 Newton remarked in a report that: 
 
…during the past few weeks the majority of the Sudetendeutsche have ceased to be even 
nominally loyal to the [Czechoslovak] state as the [SdP] leaders still profess to be. … Under 
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the stimulus of the excitement caused by the Anschluss, Sudeten Germans have come to 
believe that the present time is particularly favourable for Germany.199 
 
Despite this observation the British establishment did not fully comprehend how quickly the SdP 
ballooned into a major force in Czechoslovakia, nor why so many Sudetendeutsche desired union 
with Germany against the professed desires of their leaders. Nor did they understand why the SdP 
leadership, especially Henlein, were prepared to throw their lot in with the Nazis. Sir Samuel Hoare, 
the Home Secretary, and his friend Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Ambassador to London and son of 
Tomás Masaryk, the first Czechoslovak president, both believed that Henlein “would probably prefer 
to remain a great man in Czechoslovakia rather than a small man in Germany” and would fight 
against annexation.200 What neither the British nor the Czechs understood was how little control 
Henlein exerted over his own movement, instead remaining as an uncharismatic figurehead, a sort 
of anti-Führer, while genuine Nazis like Frank ensured gleichshaltung with the NSDAP. Officials like 
Strang and Newton, as late as May 1938, did not believe that Berlin wanted to annex the 
Sudetenland and would instead prefer to leave the Sudetendeutsche in place to exert pro-German 
political and economic influence over the rest of Czechoslovakia. 201 Halifax even believed with the 
Anschluss Berlin controlled Czechoslovakia’s only communication with Western Europe and could 
cripple the country through an economic stranglehold instead of political or military action. 202 
What the British did not understand was that under the Führerprinzip Germany foreign 
policy quickly became focused on Czechoslovakia and the digestion of Austria was largely ignored as 
a hindrance. Nor did Britain understand that Berlin was ideologically motivated. As Article I of the 
1932 NSDAP programme states: 
 
We demand the consolidation of all Germans into one great German State by reason of the 
right of self-determination.203 
 
Many Sudetendeutsche favoured union with Germany to end the Czech-bias against them and 
because the Great Depression disproportionally hit them hardest wi th two-thirds of Czechoslovakia’s 
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unemployed being Sudetendeutsche.204 Therefore union with a politically and economically powerful 
Germany was preferable to their current situation in Czechoslovakia.  
Several Sudetendeutsche political parties like the Agrarians, Industrialists and Christian 
Socialists merged with the SdP in the weeks following the Anschluss making the SdP the single 
largest party in the Czechoslovak Parliament with 49 Deputies.205 This led to calls from the Berliner 
Tageblatt that if the Czech were genuine democrats then, according to parliamentary tradition, a 
Sudetendeutsche should be the Prime Minister.206 As power solidified behind the SdP calls for 
autonomy became more strident but the Czechs were not willing to concede to their demands. 
Benes argued that Henlein was in Hitler’s pay and autonomy would give Berlin control over 
Czechoslovak internal affairs and that it was practically impossible as the Sudetenland was not one 
continuous area but rather a string of German districts in the western frontier of Bohemia and 
Moravia.207 While the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Milan Hodza, argued that if autonomy was 
granted to the Sudetendeutsche, then it would also have to be granted to the Poles, Hungarians, 
Ruthenians and Slovaks and would result in the disillusion of Czechoslovakia. 208 Prague’s continued 
resistance to even consider negotiations for autonomy, and provocations in the Sudetenland 
between SdP supporters and the Czech police, led to even greater support for the SdP. By mid-April 
1938 the major German organisations in Czechoslovakia, including the Federation of the German 
Clergy, Bohemian German Evangelical Church, German Teacher’s Association, German Political 
Labour Bureau and German Worker’s Association, all  either amalgamated with the SdP or pledged 
their allegiance.209 This led Newton to remark in a FO report that the strength of the SdP was not in 
the hands of the powerful German employers in the Sudetenland, but rather with their employees, 
as the SdP was growing into a mass movement.210 
On 24 April 1938 the SdP held a mass rally at Karlsbad where Henlein outlined the SdP’s 
political programme, denounced the creation of Czechoslovakia following the First World War, the 
denial of the right of self-determination to the Sudetendeutsche and accused the Czechs of 
establishing a dictatorship that exploited the other nationalities.211 In the Karlsbad speech Henlein 
also openly professed his movement’s adherence to the principles of Nazism, stating that it was the 
ideology of the German race and therefore it was only natural that the Sudetendeutsche adopt this 
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ideology to work within the framework of the law and press for autonomy, a sort of Nazism-light.212 
To many this was the SdP showing its true colours as a Nazi puppet, and was confirmed when on 13 
May 1938 the German Volunteer Defence Service, also known as the Freikorps Sudetenland (FS), was 
formed with Henlein as the FS’s Verbandsführer (association leader) and radical Nazi, Willi Brandner, 
as the Chief-of-Staff and de facto leader.213 SdP propaganda described the FS as “the spine of the 
movement” and “the ever watchful conscious of Sudetendeutschland” and unapologetically 
proclaimed that the FS was “required not for parades but for fighting.”214 The FS engaged in acts of 
violence and provocation, under the guise of self-defence, against the Czech security forces, Jews, 
anti-Nazi Sudetendeutsche and anyone else deemed an enemy, acting as the SdP’s SA.  
The Sudetendeutsche quickly became Nazified with pictures of Hitler appearing on 
Sudetendeutsche newspapers accompanied by maps of Grossdeutscheland; the swastika was never 
displayed with many wearing the badge of the SdP instead.215 Die Rundschau, the SdP’s weekly 
newspaper, even published an article on the use of the ‘German greeting’ (Heil Hitler and the Nazi 
salute) as the practice had quickly become commonplace amongst the Sudetendeutsche to the ire of 
the Czechs.216 
Within three months of the Austrian Anschluss the SdP had grown into a powerful political 
force in Czechoslovakia with its own FS army, millions of members from all sections of 
Sudetendeutsche society and German support. However Berlin would not turn the screws on Prague 
until two SdP, and potentially FS, men (accounts vary) were shot dead by a Czech policeman on 20 
May 1938 in Eger.217 The deaths inflamed the Sudetendeutsche populace, leading to unrest, with 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, the new German Foreign Minister, claiming that there had been over 100 
Sudetendeutsche casualties218 at the hands of the Czech police the day following the shooting and 
stating that if Prague didn’t agree to demands of autonomy then Germany would intervene .219 The 
unrest in the Sudetenland and high-ranking Nazis speaking of intervention seriously unnerved the 
Czechs and there were reports of fortifications being hastily constructed in the Sudetenland after 
rumours of German troop movements from Berlin.220 
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   War did not come to Czechoslovakia in May 1938 and the situation following the Eger Incident 
dissipated as both Berlin and London entered the fray with the Sudetenland becoming a point of 
contention between the two powers. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain adopted a policy of 
appeasement towards the Nazis, conceding to Hitler’s demands to at least postpone the wider 
conflict and allow Britain time to rebuild her defences. In this new context of internationalisation of 
an originally domestic issue, the Sudeten fifth column was to play a vital role. Through agitation and 
provocation they would ensure that the Sudetenland stayed in the international spotlight to allow 
Germany to exert pressure on Prague to extort concessions. 
 
Internationalisation of the Sudetenland Issue 
 
Unlike Austria we will fight. We shall be massacred but we will fight.  221 
 
Benes had declared after the Anschluss. A statement that worried British ears after the Eger Incident 
and a potential Czech-German war which, due to Czechoslovakia’s international alliances with 
France and the USSR, that could lead to a European conflagration. Several British officials also 
believed that the Sudetendeutsche were acting as Hitler’s catspaw and that Berlin was following a 
Bismarck-era imperial policy towards Bohemia, as its economic and strategic position allowing 
Germany domination of Central Europe.222 London understood Prague’s fears that the loyalty of the 
Sudetendeutsche could not be guaranteed in the event of a Czech-German war, a key concern as 
Czechoslovakia’s only fortifications against Germany were in the Sudetenland, and with the 
Anschluss Czechoslovakia’s south-west frontier was now exposed.223 Chamberlain along with many 
others in the British Government saw the similarities with the outbreak of the First World War and 
sought to stem the developing situation as the SdP, at Germany’s insistence, demanded the 
adoption of the Karlsbad programme and autonomy.224 
By early September 1938 tensions between the Sudetendeutsche and Prague started to boil 
as Benes steadfastly refused to make any concessions to the SdP, no matter how slight, fearing that 
it would trigger a political avalanche that resulted in German annexation of the Sudetenland. On 5 
September Henderson sent Halifax a cautionary letter stating: 
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The solution lies in Prague, not Berlin. Henlein himself has the plebiscite solution up his 
sleeve if Benes will not agree to something amounting to the Karlsbad programme  … None 
of us can ever think of peace again till Benes has satisfied Henlein … Versailles was the error 
which has got to be corrected. Much as I hate saying so. Otherwise we might fight Germany 
again.225 
 
Henderson recognised that Hitler refused to see the Sudetenland in any other light than that of a 
bastard of Versailles. This was confirmed on 12 September at the Nuremberg Rally when Hitler 
launched into a visceral verbal tirade against the Czechs.226 The following day Frank, the lead SdP 
negotiator and leader of the SdP parliamentary group, acting without He nlein’s knowledge or 
consent, rang Hodza and issued an ultimatum: Czech security forces would leave the Sudetenland 
and their functions would be assumed by the FS, otherwise the Sudetendeutsche would break into 
rebellion which would lead to German military intervention.227 Chamberlain tried to pre-empt a 
German invasion and instead proposed to meet with Hitler in Germany to try and reach a 
settlement; Hitler agreed and Chamberlain flew out to Berchtesgaden on 15 September, the same 
day Henlein fled to Germany.228 
At Berchtesgaden Hitler declared that the welfare and the right of self -determination of the 
Sudetendeutsche were his main concern, and that already 10,000 refugees had fled to Germany and 
the Czechs were firing artillery at civilian areas. He told Chamberlain that he was prepared to risk 
war to protect the Sudetendeutsche and saw the break-up of Czechoslovakia as inevitable as if he 
pressed for the Sudetendeutsche cause then it would be hard to ignore the claims of the Slovaks, 
Poles and Hungarians.229 Following the Berchtesgaden summit Harvey noted in his diary: 
 
No more news from Czechoslovakia except that it looks if the situation in Sudeten areas is 
more and more threatening. Sudeten[s] are declaring themselves in open revolt and 
Czechoslovak Government say they are obliged to consider general mobilisation. 230 
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The SdP, in particular the FS, kept the Sudetenland crisis on the boil with acts of unrest and terrorism 
against the Czechs, in the knowledge that the Czechs would respond with force and then German 
armed intervention would be justified. However the issue was now a point of international 
conjecture and a second summit was agreed to. 
On 22 September at their second meeting at Godesberg Hitler told Chamberlain that the 
Polish and Hungarian Governments had asked Germany for assistance regarding their nationalities in 
Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that Czechoslovakia was born from unwilling Germans, Slovaks and 
Hungarians whose lands were “torn away by violence” from Hungary and that the Czechs “s tole” 
Teschen and 100,000 Poles from Poland during the 1919-1921 Polish-Soviet War. He denounced 
Czechoslovakia as a state that “possessed neither a history, nor tradition, nor conditions of 
existence.”231 During a meeting the following day, Hitler presented a ‘memorandum’ for the Czechs 
to Chamberlain, which Chamberlain accurately interpreted as an ultimatum despite the title. The 
‘memorandum’ demanded that the Czechs immediately cede the Sudetenland to Germany, sever 
the alliance with the USSR and adopt a pro-German foreign policy, Chamberlain accused Hitler of 
acting like a conqueror to which Hitler replied: “no, like the owner of his property.”232 This comment 
marks Hitler’s underlying ideological motivation: he was the Führer of all Germans, not just those 
within the Third Reich and he would pursue his aim of bringing all Germans into one state regardless 
of the reality, and the Sudetendeutsche fifth column owed absolute loyalty to him as their Führer. 
This was a factor which the British were only just starting to comprehend.  
A final summit was held at Munich between the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and 
Italy from 29-30 September. The Munich Conference began with an Italian proposal that had actually 
been written by the Germans and given to Mussolini.233 The proposal was eventually agreed to by 
the four leaders, without Czechoslovak Government representatives present, and marked the break-
up of Czechoslovakia with the cessation of German, Polish and Hungarian territories. Czechoslovak 
security forces had between 1 and 10 October to evacuate from the Sudetenland and Wehrmacht 
forces were to begin moving into the territory from 1 October with a plebiscite was to be held in the 
Sudetenland to confirm the German annexation.234 Following the Munich Conference Hitler assured 
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Chamberlain that the Sudetenland was his last territorial claim in Europe and that his remaining 
European ambitions remained purely economic, a lie that resulted in war eleven months later. 235 
 
Overview 
For many the Munich Conference marks the height of Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, 
immortalised in the image of Chamberlain waving a scrap of paper, the Anglo-German Declaration 
that Hitler had not bothered to read before signing, declaring “peace for our time”. 236 However 
regarding this discourse the Munich Conference marks the power of fifth columns. The SdP had 
engineered a situation that not only achieved the aim of annexation but had also managed to 
blindside the British Empire. Fifth columns were an effective tool of German foreign policy that, so 
far, had produced once unattainable results for the Nazis. Churchill noted: 
 
In the single year 1938 Hitler has annexed to the Reich and brought under his absolute rule 
6,750,000 Austrians and 3,500,000 Sudetens, a total of over ten millions of subjects, toilers 
and soldiers. Indeed the dread balance had turned in his favour. 237  
 
By manipulating the SdP into destabilising the Czechoslovak Government, consolidating 
Sudetendeutsche support behind one unified movement and campaigning for political autonomy the 
Nazis successfully achieved the ruination of a state they despised and feared. Benes resigned after 
Munich and was eventually succeeded by Emil Hacha in November; a man described by Churchill as 
a “nonentity” now President of a rump Czechoslovak state.238 Britain was late to understand how the 
Sudetendeutsche fifth column was being used by Hitler, a failure that would be repeated in the cases 
of both Slovakia and Danzig. With each failure British understanding of these movements would 
become more and more comprehensive and the British establishment began to take note of German 
fifth columns and began developing ways to counter them. 
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  ‘Men of the para-military Sudetendeutsche Freikorps lining up to greet Hitler who was scheduled to 
arrive shortly, Niems, Sudetneland, Germany, 10 October 1938.’ Source, German Federal Archive, 
Bild 146-1972-026-51. Accessed via the World War II Database, 
http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=8348 Accessed 29 October 2015. 
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CHAPTER III – SLOVAKIA 
“Germany’s spoilt nephew” 
 
Suggestions for a severance of Slovakia from the Republic were, it is now known, put 
forward by the leaders of the German National-Socialist Party soon after Munich … It looks 
as if Slovakia was to become Germany’s spoilt nephew.239  
 
Michael Winch, a British diplomat, wrote in January 1939 shortly after a Slovak Diet was created in 
the autonomous post-Munich Slovakia. The Slovak Autonomists were spearheaded by the HSLS, a 
Slovak nationalist party that willingly offered itself as a fifth column to Berlin. Led by a Catholic 
priest, Jozef Tiso, and his deputy Karol Sidor, the party came to unify the Slovaks as the SdP unified 
the Sudetendeutsche. In a Republic already weakened by the loss of territory to Germany, Poland 
and Hungary the HSLS were to play a pivotal role in the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia. 
Despite being one the constituent parts of Czecho-Slovakia, the 2.7 million Slovaks did not enjoy 
political, economic or cultural parity with their Czech neighbours.240 These grievances crystallised 
around the HSLS who, in the knowledge of their own weaknesses in the face of Czech power, turned 
to Germany for support. Together Berlin and Bratislava would cooperate to terminate the Czech -
dominated Republic and create a new order in Central Europe that would lead to war. This chapter 
will examine the Slovak fifth column in five parts: First, Slovak-Czech relations in the First 
Czechoslovak Republic. Secondly, the formation of the HSLS, its consolidation of power in Slovakia 
and first contact with Berlin. Third, the HSLS in the post-Munich Second Czechoslovak Republic and 
Slovak autonomy. Fourth, the end of the Czechoslovak Republic, declaration of independence and 
succession as a German protectorate. Finally, the German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia 
annexing the Ancient Provinces and 7 million Czechs into the Reich and the British realisation of the 
Slovak fifth column. 
 
First Czechoslovak Republic 
As discussed in CHAPTER II, Czechoslovakia was a powerful state with a strong economy and army 
and was a lynchpin in a string of anti-German European alliances with the USSR, France, Yugoslavia 
and Romania. The Slovaks, lacking a stable economic base, virtually no army, no intelligentsia and a 
barely literate population, joined this new state out of realpolitik rather than ideological desire. They 
feared falling once again under Hungarian domination, as the last Hungarian troops only evacuated 
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Slovakia in January 1919, and instead opted to join with the Czechs.241 On 30 May 1918 the 
Pittsburgh Agreement was signed between Czech and Slovak leaders in the USA granting the two 
groups total equality in the new state.242 Jelinek described the Slovaks as “a people without a 
history” in which their devout Catholicism was their defining characteristic.243 While Freund 
summaries the union of the two nations as a meeting between a stoic Czech and a carefree Slovak, 
“if the Czech is a realist, the Slovak is a dreamer”.244 Many contemporaries noted that the two 
national characters were often at odds with one another; a conclusion many drew from this was that 
under Austro-Hungarian rule the Czechs had become politicised and developed an intelligentsia, 
whereas the Slovaks had remained agricultural serfs. George Kennan, the secretary at the US 
Legation in Prague, summaries in his famous memoirs that the Slovaks were antagonised by the 
Czechs’ “aloofness, suspiciousness and their schoolmasterly attitude”. 245 
The new Czechoslovak Republic was strong and politically stable and could be counted as 
the most successful of the Versailles successor states. However the relationship between Czechs and 
Slovaks transformed into a master-servant relationship rather than a partnership of two equals, 
Czechs dominated Slovak economic, political and cultural life. A major grievance of the Slovaks was 
that Czechs taught in Slovak schools and held government positions, yet they refused to learn or 
speak Slovak. The Czech response was that the difference between the Czech and Slovak languages 
was no greater than the difference between two dialects and that there were not enough qualified 
Slovaks to take on these positions.246 A second blow to Czecho-Slovak relations was the Great 
Depression which disproportionately hit the Slovaks harder than it did the Czechs. Slovakia’s main 
export industries, timber and woodwork, were slashed in half and iron mining fell to 20 percent 
output.247 Rising unemployment, urban migration and inefficient agricultural practices meant 
Slovakia began to starve and people started to look to the political extremes, the Communists and 
the Nationalists, who both capitalised on Slovakia’s ills.248 The most prominent Slovak nationalist 
party was the HSLS, founded in 1918 after the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic by a 
Catholic priest, Andrej Hlinka, who accused Prague of attempting to deprive the Slovak people of 
their identity, nationality and faith via political, social and economic oppression. 249 
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HSLS and Germany 
The Hlinkova slovenská l’udová strana (Hlinka Slovak People’s Party – HSLS) quickly gained popular 
support in Slovakia and quickly monopolised the Slovak seats in the Czechoslovak Parliament after 
absorbing other smaller Catholic and Protestant Slovak parties.250 Hlinka died on 16 August 1938 and 
was succeeded by Tiso, the leader of the clerical wing of the party, side-lining Sidor who represented 
the fascist wing.251 John Troutbeck, the secretary of the UK’s Prague Legation, described Tiso as a 
‘level-headed’ and ‘politically skilful’ operator who could control the radical wi ng of the HSLS.252 The 
HSLS boasted its own paramilitary force; the Hlinka Guards, named after their deceased leader and 
modelled on the SA, and the Rodobrana, a resurrected Slovak-nationalist militia that acted as a 
Slovak SS.253 The Hlinka Guard was created in June 1938 by Alexander ‘Sano’ Mach, the HSLS’s 
propaganda chief and a notorious pro-Nazi, who became the Guard’s Chief-of-Staff. Karol Murgas 
another Nazi-sympathiser was made head of the Guard’s political staff and Sidor became the 
Guard’s Supreme Commander.254 The stated aims of the Hlinka Guard was to promote Slovak 
national life, maintain order and party discipline and defend HSLS meetings and fight against Czechs, 
Jews and ‘Catholic extremists’ (Slovak political opponents) who ‘wanted [Slovakia] to be  more 
Catholic than the Pope’.255 Kennan noted of the HSLS leadership in a report to Washington: 
 
They are devout Catholics and in their mixture of nationalism and religion they resemble the 
Sinn Fein of Ireland. They are strongly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic. They have a 
predilection for swastika methods in internal politics. In foreign affairs they are more the 
moment anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian, wary of Poles and friendly with the Germans.256 
 
Mach, Murgas and many younger Slovaks were notoriously anti-Czech, anti-Semitic and anti-
Hungarian and began to look to Germany as a solution to Slovakia’s ills. 257 Unlike the Czechs, who 
maintained an anti-German bias, the Slovaks enjoyed good relations with Berlin and treated the 
Nazis as ‘the enemy of my enemy’ in the hope that Germany would facilitate the creation of a Slovak 
state.258 This played into Berlin’s hands as the Slovaks would be a perfect fifth column in 
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dismembering the remnant of the post-Munich Czechoslovak State. Kennan notes in his memoirs 
that many HSLS leaders had been cultivating ties with German officials which came as a surprise to 
Hitler on 19 October 1938 when Tiso and Ferdinand Durcansky, the editor of the HSLS newspaper 
Natsup, pressed Hitler into supporting an independent Slovak state instead of an autonomous one 
within Czechoslovakia.259 In the aftermath of Munich and the unsuccessful attempt to completely 
dissolve Czechoslovakia the Germans turned to the HSLS. Together the two would work in tandem to 
further destabilise and destroy the Republic they both despised. In a personal letter, Kennan wrote 
of the HSLS working with the Nazis: 
 
[HSLS] leaders have been completely won over by the Germans through flattery, cajolery 
and display of force. They are making awful fools of themselves; dressing up in magnificent 
fascist uniforms, flying to-and-fro in airplanes, drilling comic-opera SA units and dreaming 
dreams of the future grandeur of the Slovak nation.260 
 
Second Czechoslovak Republic 
On 7 October, one week after Munich, the HSLS, with German backing, declared Slovak autonomy 
within Czechoslovakia; on 15 December a constitutional amendment was made creating an 
autonomous Slovak Diet.261 HSLS propaganda began to speak of a ‘New Slovakia’ which electrified 
the Slovak populace and made the fall of Czechoslovakia seem imminent. In Slovak parliamentary 
elections on 18 December the HSLS secured over 98 percent of the vote and they took their seats in 
Hlinka Guard uniforms.262 Winch wrote of the newly energised HSLS, in particular its younger leaders 
such as Sidor and Durcansky: 
 
They are strongly drawn to Germany, fiercely anti-Semitic, desire a total break with Prague 
and wish for Slovakia to be placed under German protection.263 
 
One of the reasons Germany was so eager to maintain Slovakia as a territorial  entity after Munich, 
was not only to assist the dismembering of Czechoslovakia, but to prevent a common Polish -
Hungarian frontier in Eastern Europe. At Munich Germany allowed Hungary to annex the Slovak 
province of Ruthenia, with its large Hungarian population, and Poland to absorb the border city of 
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Teschen. Adding to the cloak of legitimacy provided by the principle of self -determination. After 
both countries began making further demands for Slovak territory, alienating the Slovaks, within 
weeks the HSLS published anti-Polish and anti-Hungarian propaganda and there were border 
incidents between Hlinka Guards and Hungarian militias.264 Berlin refused any further Polish and 
Hungarian demands for Slovak territory, as they wished to keep Slovakia as a buffer state between 
the two nations to prevent either one monopolising power in Eastern Europe, following a policy of 
divide and rule. Kennan noted in a report to Washington: 
 
The Slovak leaders, whether they realise it or not, are completely in German power and such 
autonomy as they enjoy exists only through the grace of Hitler. All the Germans need to do 
in present circumstances is to withdraw their opposition to a common Polish-Hungarian 
frontier, and a good part of the Slovak state will be taken over by Hungary within a week.265 
 
The Autonomous Slovak Government, under Prime Minister Tiso, also relied heavily on financial 
support from Prague, as it ran a deficit of over one billion crowns which they were unable to raise 
through taxation in the economically deprived Slovakia.266 This shortage of revenue acted as a 
moderating influence on the HSLS leaders who were forced to tone down their rhetoric against 
Prague.267 This is evident by Mach’s speech on 12 February 1939 in Plestany to thousands of Hlinka 
Guards where he publicly called for anti-Semitic and anti-Czech actions, which he claimed drove 
capital out of Slovakia, to be restrained and that revenue would only return if the Hlinka Guard 
maintained order, not engage in street violence.268 This reliance on Czech financial support annoyed 
and embarrassed many HSLS leaders, Durcansky and Mikulas Pruzinsky, the Slovak Economics 
Minister, were prepared to look to Germany to remedy this situation and further push Slovakia 
deeper in Germany’s debt, with Pruzinsky visiting Berl in in late February.269 
Whilst Bratislava required financial support from Prague the HSLS was only prepared to pay 
lip service to the idea of Czechoslovakia and continued to work for an independent Slovakia. 
Evidence of this can be found with the making of Professor Vojtech ‘Bela’ Tuka the honorary head of 
the Hlinka Guards in mid-February 1939.270 Tuka was an extreme Slovak-nationalist who had 
originally founded the Rodobrana in 1923 before being sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, of 
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which he served 10, in 1929 for treason by the Czechs.271 Mach had been one of his protégés and 
facilitated his return to public life after his release from prison; his assistance to his former, 
notoriously anti-Czech mentor and his conciliatory speech in Plestany towards the Czechs marks the 
double-standards of the HSLS leaders. They were prepared take financial support from Prague whilst 
simultaneously despising and plotting against them. In early March the UK Ambassador to Warsaw, 
Sir Howard Kennard, reported back to London that the Polish Government were convinced that 
Berlin was engineering a fresh crisis in Czechoslovakia and the negotiations over Czech financial 
assistance to Slovakia would be the point of contention.272 The British Government largely ignored 
this warning from the Poles, failing to understand how the Slovaks were being utilised by Berlin to 
create a second Czechoslovak crisis within a year of the Austrian Anschluss. In his memoirs former 
Czechoslovak President Benes, who resigned after the Munich Agreement, writes : 
 
After Munich, pressure from Berlin and the feigned or real indifference of the other 
European States to the fate of the Czech countries completely isolated the Prague 
Government.273 
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By playing towards the Slovaks, a seemingly unimportant people to the British and many other 
European powers, the Germans were able to quietly use them as a fifth column to weaken the 
Czechoslovak State a second time. An FO Memorandum brutally summaries the situation in Slovakia 
in early March 1939, placing the blame for the crisis upon the Slovak’s shoulders:  
 
In spite of the material benefits the Czechs had showered upon Slovakia they had failed to 
win over the Slovaks who took Czech misfortunes as their opportunity and modelled their 
behaviour upon that of the Germans. For example a one party system was installed, the 
Jews were oppressed and the Hlinka Guard was organised on SS lines. Nor has German 
sympathy been lacking for Slovak aspirations.274 
 
Succession 
On 6 March 1938 Newton reported back to London that negotiations between the Prague and 
Bratislava governments were heading for a crisis. Bratislava demanded financial assistance from 
Prague, as Slovakia was still part of the Republic, yet Prague’s help was conditional on Slovak loya lty 
to the Czechoslovak State.275 The HSLS leadership had no intention of remaining loyal to the 
Republic, and both Durcansky and Pruzinsky advocated for an independent Slovakia under German 
protection in HSLS propaganda.276 With negotiations breaking down and prominent Slovak leaders 
calling for succession many throughout Europe saw the Czecho-Slovak crisis as an excuse for German 
intervention after Hitler was stalled at Munich six months prior.277 Hlinka Guards began to organise 
protests, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and civil disorder as the Prague and Bratislava governments 
were at loggerheads, further inflaming the situation in Germany’s favour. 278 
Hacha accused Tiso and his government of not doing enough to restore order in Slovakia and 
allowing subversive activities, hostile to the Czechoslovak Republic, to go unchecked.279 On 10 March 
1939 Hacha dismissed Tiso and his government on the charge of not showing sufficient resistance to 
subversive activities that threatened the federal interests of the state. 280 Slovakia would still be 
allowed to retain its autonomy and Jozef Sivak, Tiso’s Schools Minister, was made Prime Minister. 281 
Hacha also accused RAVAG in Vienna of being instrumental in stirring up anti -Czech resentment 
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amongst the Slovaks to the point of disorder to justify Wehrmacht intervention to restore order.282 
This accusation was confirmed when on the night of the 10/11 March Durcansky, who had fled to 
Germany along with other HSLS leaders, broadcast a message from RAVAG encouraging the Hlinka 
Guards to maintain order and resist any Czech forces in Slovakia.283 Durcansky accused Hacha and 
the Prague Government of violating the constitution by dismissing Tiso’s government and wanting to 
exploit the Slovak nation. He then declared that Slovakia would fight for her rights with German 
support.284 
In the aftermath of Durcansky’s broadcast, with German intervention seemingly inevitable, 
British Foreign Office officials were in a quandary over Germany’s intentions for Czechoslovakia. 
Some believed that Germany desired a united Czechoslovak State within her political and economic 
sphere of influence, whilst others believed she wanted to completely dismember the Republic. 285 
Frantisek Chvalovsky, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, confided in Newton that regardless of 
Germany’s demands Prague’s only viable option was to concede to them. 286 On 11 March Tiso, 
claiming to be the legitimate Head of Government of Slovakia, formally appealed to Hitler for 
assistance in the Czecho-Slovak Crisis.287 Recognising that Germany held the momentum and any 
chance of a solution Henderson remarked in a report to London: 
 
The unpleasant fact to be faced is that no solution of the Czech problem will be worth 
anything unless it has German approval and in the interests of the Czechs themselves the 
best course will therefore be to leave the initiative to the German Government. 288 
 
On 13 March Henderson reported that German mechanised units were moving towards the Czech 
border, which had been left naked after annexation of the Sudetenland. 289 Despite declarations of 
independence from Tiso and Durcansky and German mobilisation towards Czechoslovakia British 
Foreign Office officials did not believe that Slovakia actually desired independence. They argued that 
because it was not financially self-supporting Slovakia was unfit for any degree of independence and 
that instead she would remain part of a loosely federated Czechoslovak State under German 
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influence.290 These officials essentially treated both the HSLS declarations of an independent 
Slovakia under German protection as mere sabre-rattling to scare the Czechs into granting them 
greater concessions. However they recognised that Hitler was looking for an excuse to achieve an 
ambition that was denied to him at Munich, a triumphal march on Prague.291 
On the same day Hitler invited Tiso to Berlin where he informed the Slovak leader that he 
had sympathy for the Slovak people but they would be forced to take sides, either with Berlin or 
Prague. Hitler told Tiso bluntly: 
 
Tomorrow at midday I shall begin military action against the Czechs … Germany does not 
intend to take Slovakia into her Lebensraum and that is why you must either immediately 
proclaim the independence of Slovakia or I will disinterest myself from her fate. To make 
your choice I give you until tomorrow midday when the Czechs will be crushed by the 
German steamroller.292 
 
From Hitler’s offices in the Reich Chancellery Tiso telephoned the Slovak Government in Bratislava 
and informed them of Hitler’s ultimatum. A special session of the Slovak Diet was called and at 10am 
on 14 March they declared an independent Slovak State and asked Hitler from them to be placed 
under German protection.293 Tiso returned to Bratislava as President of the independent Slovak 
Republic with Tuka as his Prime Minister, Sidor as Interior Minister and Durcansky as Foreign 
Minister, placing three violently anti-Czechs and pro-Nazis in the highest positions of government.294 
The declaration of Slovak independence also turned the country into a one -party dictatorship 
granting Tiso and his Government power to rule by decree.295 
Hacha and Chvalovsky were effectively summoned to meet Hitler on the same day and 
informed bluntly that Germany was to invade and occupy Bohemia and Moravia and that Slovakia 
was to be an independent state, if the Czechs resisted then they would be annihilated.296 Hacha had 
no choice but to accept Hitler’s ultimatum On 15 March the ‘Declaration by the German and 
Czechoslovak Governments’ was issued stating that Hacha had placed the fate of the Czechs in 
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Hitler’s hands in the hope of restoring order and Hitler had accepted.297 At 6am that day Wehrmacht 
forces invaded and occupied Bohemia and Moravia bringing an end to the Second Czechoslovak 
Republic.298 
 
Realisation 
In the wake of the disillusion of the Czechoslovak State it became evident to many British officials 
that the Germans had used the Slovaks for their own aims. A FO Minute of 17 March makes this 
abundantly clear: 
 
These latest developments remove any doubts there may have been that the Slovak 
separatists were all along in collaboration with Nazi elements in the Reich, i f not with the 
German Government themselves. Indeed, it is more likely that, had German adopted a 
neutral attitude, the [Czechoslovak] Government would have succeeded in forestalling this 
separatist coup and re-establishing tolerable relations with the Slovaks.299 
 
By mid-April British officials had obtained enough evidence to prove that the Germans had, without 
doubt, engineered the Slovak crisis and the declaration of independence on 14 March. One of the 
main pieces of evidence for the British was the 23 March German-Slovak Treaty whereby Germany 
agreed to the protection of the Slovak State, its territorial integrity and political sovereignty in 
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exchange for Wehrmacht forces being allowed to erect fortifications in a 80 km zone in western 
Slovakia in which the Wehrmacht would be granted sovereign rights, meaning they were exempt 
from Slovak civil law. The Slovak military would be organised in cooperation with the Wehrmacht 
and Bratislava would conduct its foreign policy in conjunction with Berlin’s. 300 Ostensibly the military 
zone was Germany fulfilling its role as Slovakia’s protector. However the fortifications were 
concentrated along Slovakia’s northern frontier with Poland, causing great concern for Warsaw. 301 
The Poles soon realised that their involvement in dismembering the Czechoslovak State at Munich, 
in one of the great ironies of history, had paved Hitler’s path towards his next foreign adventure as 
he turned his gaze towards Danzig and the Polish Corridor. 
The Germans formally annexed the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, 
brining millions of non-Germans into the Third Reich and formally establishing the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia on 16 March with Konstantin von Neurath as Reichsprotektor and Karl 
Hermann Frank as Secretary of State.302 Hacha still continued as President of a puppet Czech 
Government but the Czechoslovak parliament was formally dissolved on 21 March, shattering any 
illusion that the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia had not been annexed by Germany.303 The 
effect of this annexation of non-German lands was to expose Hitler as a barefaced liar: At Munich he 
had declared to Chamberlain that the Sudetenland to be his last territorial claim in Europe, but the 
invasion and absorption of the Ancient Provinces and the bringing of over 7 million Czechs into the 
Reich exposed his true imperialist ambitions. Hitler’s actions in March 1939 destroyed any chance of 
further appeasement from Britain or a rapprochement in Anglo-German relations. War with 
Germany was now virtually inevitable.304 
 
Overview 
Many contemporaries saw that the Slovak nationalists and the German imperialists had worked 
hand in glove to finally destroy the Czechoslovak Republic. Kennan wrote in a personal letter on 30 
March that the Germans had pursued a policy of divide and rule, exploiting the divisions between 
the Czechs and Slovaks and creating an environment that would precipitate an invasion. 305 Churchill 
stated that Nazi intrigues were responsible for convincing the HSLS leadership to take such a hostile 
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attitude towards the Czechs in negotiations for financial assistance and call for Slovak 
independence.306 Whilst Benes declared in his memoirs: 
 
The separation of Slovakia and the act of treason against the Republic has bee n deliberately 
planned by some Slovak separatist leaders for months with the help of the Nazis and behind 
the back of Prague. Thus with their full complicity a Slovak protectorate was also established 
in those critical days.307 
  
All contemporary sources agree that without the Slovak fifth column Germany would not have been 
able to achieve her aim of dissolving Czechoslovakia. Slovakia was the first example of the Nazis 
successfully using a non-German fifth column. The HSLS can be classified a fifth column as it fulfils all 
the classifications laid out in the Introduction for what defines a fifth column: They acted as 
Germany’s agents inside Czechoslovakia, they used the means of political subversion and disorder to 
achieve their ends, the HSLS had been gestating in Slovakia since 1918 and were quick to offer their 
services to Germany in the autumn of 1938. Leading members of the HSLS had been in contact with 
high ranking Nazi Party officials and Germany pressured the Prague Government into making 
concessions favourable to the Slovaks and finally both Bratislava and Berlin worked to achieve a 
single objective, the disillusion of Czechoslovakia. 
As with the cases of Austria and the Sudetenland the British Government was late in 
recognising the threat posed by the Slovak fifth column. However with Hitler breaking his promise 
not to incorporate the Czech provinces into the Reich the wool was finally being lifted from London’s 
eyes. Hitler and the Nazis were bent on carving out a German Empire in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the destruction of Czechoslovakia was the removal of a serious obstacle to the birth of this 
empire. The Slovak fifth column had facilitated Czechoslovakia’s demise without Hitler having to risk 
German lives in a war with Prague and Hitler would continue to use fifth columns as a weapon of 
territorial, political and economic expansion.  
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CHAPTER IV – DANZIG 
“A pawn in the game” 
 
Their object is to use the Danzig and Corridor questions as a lever to secure the 
neutralisation and ultimately, perhaps, a further partition of Poland. There is good evidence 
to show that Germany regards Danzig merely as a pawn in the game, and that her real aim is 
the break-up of the Polish State.308  
 
Declared an FO Memorandum in mid-May 1939 on the NSDAP’s activities in the Free City of Danzig. 
From the outset the British Government were aware that Berlin’s fifth column in Danzig was a wing 
of the NSDAP and was working openly, legally and unashamedly for the incorporation of Danzig into 
the Reich. The fifth column leaders in Danzig made no secret of their desires for the city’s return to 
Germany and proudly declared their unshakable belief in a Greater German Reich and their Führer. 
Compared to the fifth columns in Austria, the Sudetenland and Slovakia, who operated with a level 
of secrecy and deniability to achieve Hitler’s aims, the Danzig Nazis operated in full view of the entire 
world, making no secret of their aims or even bothering to deny them. The Danzig fifth column 
should have been successfully understood and thwarted by the British, but that was not to be the 
case. In my opinion the Danzig fifth column was the most successful of all Germany’s fifth co lumns, 
for they achieved total Gleichschaltung with the Reich before their annexation in September 1939 
with the outbreak of the Second World War. The Danzig Nazis were spearheaded by two rival men 
who hated and despised one another, Albert Forster the NSDAP Gauleiter (Regional Leader) and 
Arthur Greiser the Nazi President of the Danzig Senate.309 The Danzig Nazi Party had been founded in 
November 1925 but did not rise to prominence in the Free City until after Forster’s appointment as 
Gauleiter by Hitler on 15 October 1930. When he arrived in Danzig on 24 October Nazi propaganda 
labelled that day as a turning point in the history of the Danzig Nazis, as he turned them from a small 
band of fanatics into a powerful political force and transformed the city in a mini -Reich within a few 
years.310  
This chapter will examine the Danzig fifth column in five parts: First, the context of the Free 
City and its relations with Poland and the League of Nations. Secondly, the early electoral successes 
of the NSDAP in the 28 May 1933 Danzig Volkstag elections.311 Third, how the Danzig Nazis 
consolidated their hold on power from May 1933 until the end of 1937 through the use of political 
manipulation, agitation and repression. Fourth, how the Danzig Nazis achieved Gleichschaltung with 
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Germany between 1938 and 1939 transforming it into a ‘microcosm of the Reich’ that was still 
nominally independent from Germany.312 Finally, the lead up to the German declaration of war 
against Poland on 1 September 1939 and Danzig’s official annexation into the Reich on 2 September.  
 
The Free City, Poland and the League of Nations 
When the Free City of Danzig was established at Versailles it was placed under the auspices and 
protection of the League of Nations as a guarantee against German or Polish designs of the city and 
its valuable harbour.313 The city was governed by a Senate, serving as the executive and led by the 
Senate President as the Head of Government; in turn the Senate was elected by the Volkstag which 
was elected by popular vote; the League of Nations High Commissioner who was appointed by the 
League acted as the de facto Head of State of the Free City.314 The League, and by extension the High 
Commissioner, had three roles in Danzig; to guarantee Danzig’s constitution, to arbitrate disputes 
between Danzig and Poland and to protect the city militarily.315 This political set up was to ensure 
that neither German nor Poland exercised excessive influence or control over the Free City however 
90 percent of the population was German and many in the administrative, economic and political  
elite were Reichsdeutsche who were intensely nationalistic.316 Historians like Kimmich have even 
argued that 96 percent317 of Danzig’s populace were German and the Prussian elite, in particular 
military officers, pensioners and civil servants set the tone of the city’s nationalistic leanings.318 In 
1919 at Versailles one official described the new Free City as “unquestionably German”, a point that 
the Nazis would later use to justify reunification with the Reich.319 
Versailles not only created the Free City out of the old Kaiserreich but also created the Polish 
Corridor, to give Poland direct access to the sea and splitting East Prussia with its population of 1.6 
million Germans from the rest of the Reich.320 The Poles called the Corridor Pomorze and considered 
it part of their ancestral homeland, despite its large German population that remained after 
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Versailles.321 Not only did many Germans see the Polish Corridor as an insult to their national pride 
but they saw it as an economic and military threat to East Prussia. They complained that the Polish 
were neglecting east-west communications routes across the Corridor in favour of north-south 
routes along it and that this hampered East Prussia’s economy, but also in the event of war with 
Poland it would be impossible to transport troops, weapons and supplies from Germany leaving East 
Prussia virtually defenceless.322 
Versailles established Danzig as Poland’s principle harbour on the Baltic Coast, however the 
Poles realised early on that they couldn’t rely solely on Danzig. During the 1919-1921 Polish-Soviet 
War German dockworkers in Danzig refused to unload war supplies bound for Poland, reinforcing 
Polish suspicions about the reliability of Danzig as her main harbour. 323 The Polish solution was to 
establish a new port on the narrow strip of coast afforded to them on the Polish Corridor in the small 
fishing village of Gdynia eight miles north west along the coast from Danzig.324 Construction began in 
1924 and by 1939 the population had grown to 100,000, many Danzigers saw Gdynia as an economic 
threat to their transit traffic and by 1933 Gdynia surpassed Danzig in total freight turnover. 325 Many 
Danzigers, British and German officials, saw the construction of Gdynia as a deliberate Polish ploy to 
economically strangle Danzig, whereas the Poles argued that they were simply improving and 
diversifying their economic infrastructure.326 As with the Polish Corridor many Germans saw a 
military threat from Gdynia. The 1922 Danzig Constitution established Danzig as a demilitarised city 
with no standing army or defensive fortifications, however Gdynia as sovereign Polish territory could 
become a naval base and billet soldiers to protect the Polish Corridor from German revision and 
apply further pressure to Danzig.327 
The 1919 census of Danzig puts the total population of the city at 324,000 with 308,000 of 
them German and 16,000 Poles, by the 1929 census the Polish population dropped to 15,000 
whereas the German community grew to 387,000.328 Danzig’s German population were deeply 
nationalistic, whom Warsaw saw as a threat to Poland, the Poles saw a demilitarised Danzig on the 
mouth of the Vistula River as key to their independence. The Military Attaché in the UK Warsaw 
Embassy noted that if Danzig were to be occupied by German troops then the defence of the Polish 
Corridor would be compromised and the German Army could use the city to facilitate an invasion of 
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Poland.329 Despite these concerns the Polish Government, led by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, adopted a 
cautious policy towards Danzig after Hitler came to power in 1933, knowing that Hitler would have 
to consolidate his power in Germany before making any demands regarding the Free City. 330 What 
Warsaw did not understand, and neither did London, Paris nor Geneva331, was that Forster since 
becoming Gauleiter had reformed, reorganised and strengthened the NSDAP that would quickly 
capitalise on Hitler’s ascension to power in Berlin.  
 
Early Successes for the NSDAP 
Before the 28 May 1933 Volkstag elections the NSDAP had steadily been gaining seats, mirroring the 
electoral successes of the NSDAP in the Reich before March 1933. The first elections the Danzig 
Nazis contested under Forster’s leadership were on 16 November 1930 where the NSDAP won 16 
percent of the popular vote with twelve out of seventy-two seats in the Volkstag.332 The NSDAP’s 
electoral gains in 1930 cemented Forster’s authority over his rivals amongst the Danzig Nazis and 
reinforced Hitler’s confidence in him. Official statistics published by the Danzig NSDAP state that the 
membership of the Party grew from 800 in June 1930 to over 9,500 by December 1932, and the 
Party moved its headquarters to the centre of Danzig’s business and shopping district, 
demonstrating the financial resources they had gained as a result of this electoral gain. 333 Greiser led 
the Nazi contingent in the Volkstag and his verbal attacks on Liberals, Poles and Marxists won him, 
and the NSDAP, allies and supporters amongst the other German Nationalist parties in the 
Volkstag.334 On 28 May 1933, less than five months after Hitler was appointed Chancellor, the NSDAP 
won the Volkstag elections outright with 50.03 percent of the popular vote which translated into 
thirty-eight out of seventy-two seats.335 Kimmich makes an interesting note, in the 5 March 1933 
Reichstag elections in Germany the NSDAP, whose leader was Chancellor, won 43.9 percent of the 
vote.336 Kimmich puts this down to a greater feeling of German nationalism amongst the Danzigers, 
high unemployment and tensions with Poland.337 
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Hermann Rauschning became the first NSDAP Senate President and Greiser served as his 
deputy and Senator for the Interior which gave the NSDAP control of the Danzig Police. 338 However 
both men were subordinate to Gauleiter Forster who had been given total authority over the Danzig 
Nazis, an example of the Führerprinzip where a selected official held power over an elected one in 
the Nazi hierarchy due to his relationship with the Führer. Despite winning an absolute majority in 
the Volkstag the NSDAP couldn’t turn Danzig into an outright Nazi state, the Const itution was 
guaranteed by the League, required a two-thirds vote in the Volkstag before it could be changed and 
there was always the threat of Polish and/or League intervention.339 Instead the NSDAP was going to 
have to Nazify Danzig by stealth without provoking Geneva or Warsaw. On 24 June 1933 the 
Volkstag voted the Senate emergency powers, much like the 24 March 1933 Enabling Act granted 
Hitler emergency powers in Germany, by a vote of fifty to nineteen. 340 The Nazis claimed that the 
powers were necessary for them to rectify Danzig’s crippling economic problems, including its high 
unemployment rate, however that went hand in hand with the transformation of Danzig into a Nazi 
state. 
 
Consolidating Power 
The main threat to the NSDAP’s early successes in Danzig was intervention by Poland. Berlin knew 
that the Poles had a large, well-equipped army that outnumbered the Reichswehr and that, if 
provoked by the new Nazi Government in Danzig, could easily overrun and occupy the city. Hitler 
knew he had to placate Warsaw, which would secure his eastern border and give the Danzig Nazis 
greater freedom in which to operate, acting as the sponsor to his fifth column. At the same time the 
Polish Government were wary of Hitler’s intensions and sought to directly negotiate with  him, 
spurred on by his Foreign Minister, Jozef Beck, Pilsudski negotiated the German -Polish Non-
Aggression Pact on 26 January 1934.341 Hitler also sought to use this agreement to prove to the Poles 
that he had no designs on Danzig or the Corridor, stating in an interview with the Daily Mail on 6 
August 1934: 
 
On our eastern frontier I have proved our peaceful intentions by making a pact with 
Poland.342 
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With the immediate threat of Polish intervention nullified and a host of Polish -Danzig disputes 
rectified with the 1934 Pact, the Danzig Nazis had free reign to remove their rivals in the city, 
including opposition parties and the League’s High Commissioner, Sean Lester.  
The Nazis first targeted their political opponents in Danzig using violence and intimidation 
with SA and SS men. For example a 700 strong meeting of the German National Party on 12 June 
1936 was attacked by plainclothed Nazis after the police had been ordered to keep away from the 
meeting, thirty-two people were injured and one SA man died, two days later two SS men were 
killed in a fight with the Social Democrats.343 The funerals of the three Nazi men were attended by 
Himmler, flags were lowered to half-mast and memorial services were held across the city, the 
Danzig Nazis had new martyrs and were prepared to use to apparatus of state to advance their 
aims.344 On 7 April 1935 fresh Volkstag elections were held where the Nazis achieved 59 percent of 
the vote and 43 seats, as they cracked down on opposition parties several Volkstag deputies 
defected to the NSDAP or were removed from their seats on dubious charges by the NSDAP. 345 
Despite this second electoral success the Nazis were still short of the two-thirds majority, 48 seats, 
required to change the Danzig Constitution so they resorted to repression to eliminate their 
opposition.346 
Empowered by the emergency powers of 1933 the Senate passed new decrees from the July 
1936 to February 1937 repressing any opposition. A decree of 16 July empowered the police to 
arrest anyone suspect of a political offence and keep them in protective custody for three months 
without a trial, several opposition deputies in the Volkstag found themselves victim of this decree.347 
On 11 January another decree extended the length of protective custody for political offenders from 
three months to indefinitely and on 4 February a decree declared that any Volkstag deputy who 
failed to fulfil his duties, such as by fleeing abroad or being in police protective custody, would be 
stripped of their seat.348 The Nazi repression of any official opposition was completed on 1 
November 1937 when the Senate passed a decree banning the formation of any new political 
parties, threatening three years imprisonment for those who dared.349 Through these methods the 
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Nazis usurped more seats in the Volkstag and by October 1937 had 51 seats, more than the two-
thirds required to change the Constitution.350 
The final obstacle to the Danzig Nazis was the League High Commissioner, Irish diplomat 
Sean Lester, who remained the sole counter to outright Nazification of Danz ig. Mussolini’s invasion 
of Abyssinia in October 1935 provided the perfect distraction for the Danzig Nazis, with the League 
occupied with Italy they would not be able to lend their full support to Lester and Forster and 
Greiser were able to steadily subvert him.351 Forster dealt the death-blow to Lester by publically 
attacking him in a speech on 16 June 1936 blaming him for creating disputes between Germany and 
Poland over Danzig, agitating against NSDAP rule and allowing disorder to run rampant by 
hampering Nazi policies.352 Combined with an inflammatory speech by Greiser in Geneva on 4 July 
1936 Lester’s position was unattainable and he resigned his post on 5 October 1936. 353 Lester’s 
successor, Swiss diplomat Carl Burckhardt, was unable to stem the Nazification of Danzig with the UK 
Consul-General writing in October 1937: 
 
The High Commissioner’s policy has been to try to re-establish within the limits of what is 
now possible the contact between the League and Danzig which was almost lost through the 
events of 1936. In order to do so he has let the Nazis do virtually as they like in constitutional 
matters.354 
 
On 10 October 1937 Forster gave a speech saying that since Lester’s resignation the NSDAP had kept 
order in Danzig without further intervention from the League and Burckhardt’s only job was to 
preserve the well-being of German Danzig.355 In speech on 19 January 1938 Greiser referred to the 
German State of Danzig and that his government ran the city on Nazi principles to achieve success 
and solidarity independent of the League.356 Despite the blatant Nazification of Danzig the British 
Government was not prepared to counter it, with Eden telling Henderson on 15 July 1937 that it was 
government policy not to interfere in Danzig’s internal affairs as it would sour Ang lo-German 
relations.357 The fifth column was deliberately allowed to turn Danzig into a mini -Reich. 
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‘A microcosm of the Reich’ 
 
It was true that Danzig was separated from the Reich but it was also a fact that the 
population had the same faith in Hitler as the inhabitants of the Reich … For the German 
nation Danzig was always ready to make any sacrifice.358 
 
Forster declared in a Berlin speech on 18 January 1938 marking the increased Gleichschaltung 
between Danzig and Germany, beginning with the amalgamation of the Danzig SS, SA, NSDAP, NSKK 
and NSFK with their East Prussian counterparts in the winter of 1937/38. 359 A labour camp was 
opened in August 1938, ostensibly to further reduce unemployment but there were rumou rs that 
2,800 German political prisoners were imprisoned there and in a speech to the NSDAP leaders on 3 
October Forster stated that 2,000 Jews had left Danzig since October 1937 and new laws would be 
introduced enhance Gleichschaltung with Germany.360 Anti-Semitic propaganda and policies 
intensified in Danzig until 9 November where, mirroring Germany, the city exploded into an orgy of 
violence, arson, looting and repression against Danzig’s Jewish population. 361 As a comparison to the 
Kristallnacht in Germany, which lasted one night, the Danzig pogrom lasted four days, with many of 
the city’s Jews placed in ‘labour’ camps outside the city and Forster announced that legal measures 
against the Jews would be enacted.362 On 23 November the infamous Nuremberg Laws363 were 
enacted in Danzig, bringing the city’s legal system in line with Germany’s. 364 
With the Danzig Kristallnacht and the adoption of the Nuremberg Laws the Nazification of 
Danzig was complete to which an FO Memorandum later stated; “the Free City internally i s virtually 
a microcosm of the Reich.”365 On 31 December 1938 Forster gave an address where he summarised 
the Gleichschaltung of Danzig: 
 
We have done away with the parties and have created solidarity among the Germans … We 
have, to the utmost of our ability, assimilated the internal life of Danzig and its laws to those 
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of the Reich. We have … taken up the Jewish problem … and are engaged in effect a final 
solution of it.366 
 
German-Polish relations in Danzig quickly soured with violent incidents between the two 
groups becoming increasingly common, the most noticeable was between 24-27 February 1939 at 
the Danzig Polytechnic where German students, wearing Nazi uniforms, forcibly ejected Polish 
students many of whom were immediately arrested by the Danzig Police. 367 The incident was 
sparked by the Polish Students Society stating that ‘only the Polish nation had the right to control 
the mouth of the Vistula’, which resulted in a diplomatic incident between Danzig and Polish that 
was only resolved when on 27 February Warsaw publicly disassociated itself from the statement of 
its own students.368 Danziger Vorposten369 further stirred up anti-Polish sentiment in Danzig by giving 
prominence to German-Polish incidents provoked by Poles and ignored those instigated by 
Germans.370 The continuation of German-Polish incidents, and Geneva and Warsaw’s failure to 
prevent them, led to Kennard to report in May 1939: 
 
The Nazification of Danzig and the impotence of [Burckhardt] have subsequently altered the 
balance to Poland’s detriment, albeit with her tactic consent. In the Free State territory the 
Nazi Party are the oppressors and not the oppressed.371 
 
Coinciding of the final disillusion of Czechoslovakia and Hitler making territorial demands of Poland, 
the NSDAP began the militarisation of Danzig by proxy.372  Executive Order 103 armed a hundred, 
potentially thousands, of NSDAP members including SS, SA, NSKK, NSFK and HJ officers. 373 The 
NSDAP had also established an auxiliary schutzpolizei374 equipped with modern weapons including 
machine-guns, rifles and armoured cars and which all men between 18 and 25 were liable to be 
conscripted into and those between 25 and 50 were automatically placed on the schutzpolizei 
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reserves.375 Both the British and Polish Consul-Generals in Danzig saw the schutzpolizei as 
indistinguishable from soldiers as they wore near-identical uniforms of the Wehrmacht and 
undertook military exercises along the Danzig-Polish border.376 Gerald Shepherd, the UK Consul-
General in Danzig, even noted that the 1,000 SS-men, 4,000 SA-men and NSKK377 were armed with 
rifles that “appeared to be brand new”, believing, as many did, that Germany was smuggling 
weapons into Danzig and there were secret weapon caches throughout the city, there were  also 
rumours of 37mm infantry guns being smuggled in from East Prussia.378 Many young Danzigers also 
performed their military service in the Wehrmacht before returning, combined with the schutzpolizei 
and Nazi paramilitary organisations, the Danzig Nazis controlled a well-armed, well-trained and 
fanatically loyal fighting population that, in the event of war with Poland, could be used to hold out 
against a Polish attack until Wehrmacht relief arrived.379 
By May 1939 the British had realised Germany’s intentions regarding Danzig and the 
Corridor after Hitler annexed the remains of Czechoslovakia, breaking his Munich promise, and saw 
the militarisation of Danzig as a tangible threat to Polish sovereignty and peace: 
   
If the Nazis militarise Danzig they will have a stranglehold on the Corridor.380 
 
August to September 1939 – Invasion and the Second World War 
German-Polish relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the German occupation of Bohemia and 
Moravia and the subsequent German-Slovak Treaty as Berlin issued three demands to Warsaw; the 
return of Danzig to Germany, an extra-territorial communications line across the Polish Corridor and 
for Poland to align its foreign policy with Germany.381 Unlike Austria and Czechoslovakia, who 
buckled under German demands, Poland stood firm as Kennard reported back to London after a 
conversation with Beck: 
 
[Beck] added categorically that should Germany occupy Danzig, Poland would fight. 382 
 
London and Warsaw saw the fates of Danzig, the Corridor and European peace were intertwined and 
that if one should fall to Hitler it would start a domino effect that would result in an invasion of 
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Poland and wider European conflagration, something that had been narrowly avoided at the Munich 
Conference. Chamberlain’s guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939 was an attempt to rein in Hitler 
but the effect in Danzig was to make both sides more resolute. 383 Poland reasserted that any 
attempt to alter Danzig’s status would be met with armed resistance and Nazi propaganda in Danzig 
vehemently denounced Britain and Poland with Danziger Vorposten encouraged Danzigers to 
publically show their affection for the NSDAP and celebrate the annexation of Czechoslovakia. 384 The 
Danzig Nazis attempted to goad Poland into action by attacking Polish Customs inspectors in Nazi 
uniforms, highlighting German-Polish incidents however trivial and holding mass rallied with the 
support of 6,000 SA men from East Prussia.385 By now London had learnt that Hitler could no longer 
be trusted as Harvey noted in his diary: 
 
All German propaganda is now making out Danzig as a special and isolated claim, while we 
know after Czechoslovakia that it is only the first step to the weakening and partition of 
Poland.386 
 
Poland would not be goaded into taking aggressive measures by NSDAP’s agitations, as they saw the 
German-Slovak Treaty as a threat to their southern flank as German fortifications in Slovakia were 
directed towards Poland.387 With German forces on her southern, western and northern frontier (via 
East Prussia) Warsaw was not in the position to be the aggressor and instead relied on her 
guarantees with Britain and France to keep Germany at bay. Kennard believed there were only three 
possible scenarios for the future of Danzig, as it was clear that Germany would not back down: Either 
the Danzig Senate would issue a desire for a return to Germany without public support from Berlin; 
or Berlin would publically support the Senate’s desire with military or non -military measures; or 
Berlin would demand the return of Danzig with the threat of military action. 388 As with Austria and 
Czechoslovakia the impetus for change would came from Hitler and he had utilised his fifth column 
extremely effectively in Danzig to create tensions with Poland and justify war. 
By late August 1939 the world was set for war. In Danzig on 23 August Forster was elevated 
to the new position of Staatsoberhaupt (Chief of State), side-lining his rival Greiser and the Danzig 
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Senate making him the mini-Reich’s mini-Führer.389 This has parallels with Seyss-Inquart’s 
appointment as Austrian Chancellor for two day in March 1938, in each case NSDAP had one of their 
supports in a position of total authority who would formalise the annexation of each terri tory, acting 
as the indigenous Nazi who was returning his land and people into the embraces of the Reich. On 25 
August Kreigsmarine cruiser Schleswig-Holstein arrived in Danzig and at 4:45am on 1 September 
opened fire on Polish defences on Westerplatte 390 and NSDAP Danzig paramilitary forces quickly 
occupied Polish installations and facilities in the city and Forster officially returned the city to 
Germany on 2 September.391 
 
Overview 
The Danzig fifth column was to be the last of Germany’s effective fifth column movements. By 
copying the NSDAP’s successes in the Reich and removing opponents piecemeal, including the 
League of Nations, the Nazis were able to easily facilitate Danzig’s return to Germany and war with 
Poland. The Danzig Nazis perhaps best fit the description of a parasite, their power grew like a 
cancer and rotted the Free City from within, destroying the Constitution, neutering the League of 
Nations and slowly militarising the city, until they had created a perfect storm by antagonising 
Poland that Hitler could justify the great war he always dreamed of.  
 In Berlin Hitler used the bombastic language and threat of provoking a European war that he 
had used with Austria and Czechoslovakia in an attempt to deter British (and French) intervention. 
However he had cried wolf too many times, broken too many promises and by the beginning of 
September 1939 the British rearmament programme had been completed in the eleven month 
breathing space afforded to it by Munich. Britain and France jointly declared war on Germany on 3 
September 1939 and Hitler had what he always feared, a war on two fronts.  
After their experiences and failures in Austria, Czechoslovakia and now Danzig, the British 
had learned plenty about how these organisations manifest and conduct themselves. With the 
dawning of the Second World War Britain was able to take a more aggressive and intrusive policy 
towards future German fifth columns in Iraq and Iran, not having to care for the delicate diplomatic 
protocols that they had before the war, and instead acting on military necessity.  
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  The opening shots of the Second World War. 
 
‘Schleswig-Holstein bombarding Westerplatte, Danzig, 1 September 1939’. Source, World 
War II Database, http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=1835 Accessed 29 October 2015. 
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CHAPTER V – IRAQ 
“Gilded with Axis gold” 
 
[The] Golden Square [is] gilded with Axis gold … [The] military leaders and Rashid Ali know 
that their necks are forfeit if the Regent returns to power, and the Axis agents are goading 
them into action.392 
 
RAF command in Iraq wrote four days after a military-political coup in Baghdad where the pro-British 
government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Said was replaced by the pro-German regime of Rashid Ali al-
Gaylani. Rashid Ali’s government was supported by a cabal of four military officers known as the 
Golden Square, led by Salah ad-Din al-Sabbagh, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-
Husseini.393 The Golden Square were the true power within domestic Iraqi politics and had 
engineered the downfall of numerous Iraqi governments who tried to limit their power. Rashid Ali 
and his civilian government were to be their political puppets and give an aura of constitutional 
legitimacy to a military takeover. The Golden Square and Rashid Ali were also intensely nationalistic, 
blending an ideology of Pan-Arabism, Sunni Islam, fascism, anti-Semitism and anti-Imperialism into 
an anti-British and pro-German sentiment whose political philosopher was al -Husseini who had 
already stirred up this ideology into rebellion during the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in the British 
Mandate of Palestine. The Iraqi fifth column were like the Slovak fifth column, an indigenous 
organisation that sought to place itself at the behest of the German Government to achieve the 
same political ends, in this case to take Iraq out of the British fold and place it within the German 
fold under its support and protection. However, unlike the Slovak fifth column, and the other 
previous cases already examined in this essay, the Iraqi fifth column takes place within the paradigm 
of the Second World War. Britain no longer had need of diplomatic niceties, international obligations 
or long-term effects to consider before attempting to counter the fifth column. Britain had but one 
objective, ‘win the war’, and some argue that ‘by any means necessary’ be added to that task. Now 
under Churchill’s decisive, firm and belligerent leadership, unlike Chamberlain’s sober, careful and 
conciliatory one, the British were prepared to take aggressive action against the Iraqi fifth column, 
refusing to allow a cabal of ideologues to hamstring the war effort in the Middle East and deliver the 
Germans a key strategic pivot in the heart of the British Empire.  
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This chapter will examine the Iraqi fifth column in five sections: First, the context of the 
Kingdom of Iraq and its relations with Britain and Germany. Secondly, the key figures within the fifth 
column, the Golden Square, the Grand Mufti and Rashid Ali, their backgrounds, motivations and 
plans. Third, how the fifth column leaders sought to court German support and Germany’s response 
before their coup. Fourthly, the coup of 3 April 1941 that brought Rashid Ali to power and the Anglo-
Iraqi War of 2-31 May 1941. Finally how Germany responded to the April coup and subsequent war 
with Britain, what support they lent to the fifth column and, if at all, how effective it was.  
 
Iraq, Britain and Germany 
The Kingdom of Iraq formally became an independent state in 1932 after first being a British 
Mandate carved out from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The 1930 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that transformed the Kingdom from a mandate into a sovereign state, but it 
allowed Britain to exercise indirect control over Iraq’s domestic politics, foreign policy, military, 
economy and perhaps most importantly, oil.394 Britain was allowed to retain its RAF bases and 
maintain transit rights for its armed forces across Iraq in addition to controlling the Iraqi military and 
supplying it’s weaponry. The treaty would become a sticking point between the Iraqi political elite, 
who saw both personal and national advantages to being under British influence, and Arab 
nationalists, to whom the treaty was both embarrassing and insulting and they desired the creation 
of a single, unified pan-Arab state in the Middle East, instead of the patchwork of artificial nation 
states under the sway of the British and French Empires. 
One of the most prominent pro-British politicians was Nuri al-Said who served in various 
cabinet posts and from 1930-1958 would be Iraqi Prime Minister eight times. He was aware that any 
government’s ability to rule Iraq was tenuous and that British support was required to add order into 
Iraq’s chaotic political system, where governments formed and collapsed within months and even 
weeks. From 1938-1941 al-Said would be the most vocal proponent of a pro-German fifth column in 
Iraq, in the knowledge that his rule would be strengthened if London believed in a German plot 
against Britain.395 Churchill was incredibly receptive to al-Said’s warnings about a German fifth 
column in Iraq; Germany had tried to stir up anti-British sentiment amongst the Empire’s Muslim 
populace in the First World War and Churchill himself had seen during the Mahdist War (1881-1899) 
in Sudan396 how Islam could be used to crystallise an anti-Imperialist coalition.397  
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With the advent of the Second World War Germany tried to continue this Kaiserreich policy 
of courting Islam, by highlighting that both Islam and Nazism shared common enemies, the USSR, 
the British Empire and the Jews, and tried to stir up Muslim populations in both the British Empire 
and Soviet Union into open rebellion.398 Compared to Britain, and many other European nations, 
Germany exerted little influence in the Middle East, although under the Nazis trade with Muslim 
nations like Turkey, Iraq and Iran had increased but thet were unable to break the British trade 
monopoly on the region.399 Many within the German Government were also totally disinterested in 
fostering any relations within the Middle East for a variety of reasons; before Munich they were still 
trying to court Britain and didn’t want to provoke any tensions  over British influence in the Middle 
East and the 1936 Italo-German Agreement left the Middle East and the Mediterranean within the 
Italian sphere of influence.400 The Italians were deeply unpopular in the Middle East for several 
reasons, including Italy’s harsh rule of Libya and the Abyssinian War, many Arab leaders had no wish 
to remove the British only to have them replaced by the Italians. 401 The British were especially 
concerned about Italian designs on the Middle East, and German facilitation of those de signs, as the 
Italians had sponsored the Arab Revolt,402 and as the Italians fell increasingly under German 
influence during the course of the war London warned Baghdad that the Italian Legation should be 
seen as a German substitute.403   
However Germany did have support from some sections of Iraqi society; many senior Iraqi 
officers had formerly been part of the Ottoman Military and had been trained by Reichswehr officers 
before and during World War One.404 By World War Two many of these officers were in politically 
powerful positions in Iraq and were highly receptive of Germany’s anti -Imperialist attitude regarding 
the Middle East, believing that the Germans would help them expel the British and act as a restraint 
on the Italians.405 A CSC memorandum in June 1940 wrote: 
 
Anti-British feeling runs high, particularly among the younger officers. There are doubts as to 
the loyalty of the Army in an emergency and German exploits do more than merely evoke 
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admiration. There are reports of Fifth Column organisation, though these reports do not give 
precise information on the size or power of such an organisation as exists. 406 
 
By December 1940 the British received their first solid evidence on German designs on Iraq and how 
they planned to use their fifth column after the Iraqi Charge d’Affaires in the Tehran Legation 
informed the British of the activities of a German agent known as ‘Mayr’. Mayr sought to make 
contact with known anti-British and pro-German Iraqis from a list provided by Fritz Grobba, the 
former German Minister to Baghdad, and mentioned that Germany would prefer a political coup in 
Iraq over sabotage, terrorism and insurrection.407 
 
The Most Dangerous Men in the Middle East 
At the end of the Anglo-Iraqi War many of the fifth column leaders fled to neighbouring Iran. The FO 
sent a telegram to Sir Reader Bullard, the UK Minister in Tehran, where they listed the fifth column 
leaders, the Grand Mufti, the Golden Square and Rashid Ali, as the most dangerous individuals to 
British interests in the Middle East.408  
The Grand Mufti was, to all intents and purposes, public enemy number one to the British 
Empire in the Middle East. He had played a key role in the Arab Revolt which was instigated by the 
Arab Higher Committee, which he chaired, and was ostensibly in response to Jewish immigration 
into Palestine under British auspices.409 After the Arab Revolt was supressed and he fled to Iraq he 
acted as a crystallising factor in Baghdad drawing together Rashid Ali and his political cronies and the 
Golden Square with their domestic military might. Al-Husseini was definitely an extremist ideologue 
who despised the British presence in the Middle East and saw Nazi Germany as a powerful ally who 
would help him achieve his own ends. As far as he was concerned from 1939 to 1941 the USSR, 
Japan and Italy all supported Germany against the imperialist powers in the Middle East, Britain and 
France, and therefore the Arab peoples should support the Axis powers too, even if they feared 
Italian designs on the Middle East.410 Al-Husseini arrived in Baghdad in October 1939 where the Iraqi 
Parliament voted to give him a salary and pay for his personal expenses, using Iraqi taxpayers’ 
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money.411 He pledged to al-Said’s government that he would refrain from entering Iraqi politics 
during his stay in Baghdad. However he quickly attracted the attention of the fiercely nationalist al -
Sabbagh and the Golden Square who saw the Grand Mufti as an Arab nationalist hero for his role in 
the Arab Revolt.412 
The Golden Square consisted of four Iraqi generals who controlled the Iraqi military, and by 
extension Iraqi politics by engineering a series of military coups and shifting their allegiances 
between different political factions. The Golden Square consisted of Salah ad-Din al Sabbagh, the 
commander of the 3rd Division, Jamal Shabib, the commander of the 1st Division, Mahmud Salman, 
the commander of Iraq’s only mechanised brigade and Fahmi Said, the commander of the RIAF. 413 
These four men came from similar backgrounds, they were lower-middle class and had joined the 
Ottoman Army as officers for educational, career social and financial advancement before forming 
the backbone of the new Iraqi Officer Corps after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. 414 They 
directly controlled half of Iraq’s military and practiced cronyism to control the other half, with men 
in position of power not based on merit but loyalty to the Golden Square. 415 As one Baghdad 
Embassy report stated: 
 
There are also junior officers who for a variety of reasons support the political adventures of 
[the Golden Square] and Fahmi Said is said to have taken pains to introduce into units under 
his command officers of bad character over whom he has personal command. 416 
 
Al-Sabbagh emerged as the leader of this military clique and guided it with his own political 
philosophy. He himself was half-Iraqi and half-Lebanese and was a fervent Pan-Arabist who dreamed 
of a unified Arab State free from Western imperial influences, an ideology he shared with the Gran d 
Mufti whom he treated as a political grandfather.417 An Embassy report stated that Al-Sabbagh and 
the Golden Square were motivated by extreme Arab nationalism that could only be realised by a 
German victory in a war against Britain, and that this notion was advocated by the Grand Mufti 
whilst he guested in Baghdad.418 However Al-Sabbagh wrote in al-Urubah fi al-Iraq, his own political 
memoir, that he was guided by only two things, his nation and his faith: 
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I do not believe in the democracy of the English nor the Nazism of the Germans nor the 
Bolshevism of the Russians. I am an Arab Muslim. I do not want anything as a substitute in 
the way of pretensions and philosophies.419 
 
In this regard Al-Sabbagh shared a lot in common with Jozef Tiso of the HSLS and the Slovak fifth 
column: Both placed nation and faith at the core of their ideologies and turned to Hitler’s Germany, 
a strong and dynamic power, to achieve their own agendas. By turning to Germany for assistance 
the British were able to paint the Golden Square as a ‘pro-German gang’ in their propaganda  and 
internal correspondence, who cared nothing for the Iraqi people and instead only for selfish 
advancement at the heels of their masters in Berlin.420  
The final fifth column leader was Rashid Ali al-142Gaylani, the man who would become the 
public, political and, as far as the fifth column was concerned, legitimate face of post-British Iraq. 
Unlike the Golden Square he did not have a military background and instead had been part of the 
Ottoman judicial system, a professor at the Baghdad School of Law and his first cabinet post in 1924 
was as Justice Minister.421 Rashid Ali was without doubt al-Said’s greatest political rival with each 
man representing the anti and pro-British factions in Iraqi politics respectively. Shortly after the 
beginning of the Anglo-Iraqi War Sir Miles Lampson, the UK Ambassador to Cairo, sent a draft 
statement on Rashid Ali to the FO for BBC Arabic to use in an official propaganda broadcast. In his 
draft he said of him: 
 
No one trusts him. Some fear him. All hate him, except Iraq’s enemies … 422 
 
The Iraqi fifth column finally came together on 28 February 1941 in the Grand Mufti’s Baghdad 
residence. General Taha al-Hashimi, the former Chief of the General Staff, and current Prime 
Minister, was seen by many, both British and Iraqi, to be of dull personality and low intellect but was 
Britain’s best chance of curtailing the Golden Square’s power.423 The fifth column leaders saw him as 
nothing more than a British stooge and that his attempts to break off diplomatic relations with Italy 
were a symptom of his disloyalty to the pan-Arabist cause.424 After the meeting of the 28 February 
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the fifth column leaders stepped up their attempts to court Germany in support of their planned 
coup. 
 
Courting Germany 
It is unknown if any of the Iraqi fifth column leaders fully understood Nazism and its adherents in 
Germany. Mein Kampf had limited print runs in Arabic with only a few hundred copies in each run 
and literacy rates across the Middle East were far lower than they were in the Europe.425 Hitler’s 
racial hierarchy placed the Arabs above Slavs and Jews and the Nazis cared little for the future of the 
Arab peoples, seeing them as useful pawns in their clash of civilisations with the British Empire and 
the planned invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.426 By existing outside of Hitler’s war plans the 
Arabs were never guaranteed strong support from Berlin, something that would later lead to the 
ruination of Rashid Ali, the Golden Square and the Grand Mufti. Many Arab nationalist felt that 
Germany was not the best choice of ally in their struggle against Britain; Hitler’s occupation of 
Bohemia and Moravia and his unprovoked invasion of Poland revealed him for the habitual liar that 
he was, tarnishing his reputation in many eyes.427 For these pan-Arabists whilst British rule may be 
bad for the Arab peoples, it was far better to stick with the devil they knew than Hitler who may 
later chuck them to his Italian ally as a reward for their loyalty. However for the fifth column l eaders 
Hitler’s Germany was their only choice of recourse; only Germany was strong enough to drive the 
British from the Middle East and keep the Italians on a short leash.  
The first contact between the Arab nationalists and the German Government came in Ju ly 
1940 when Naji Shawkat, then Justice Minister and a protégée of Rashid Ali, travelled to Istanbul on 
the pretence of going for medical treatment.428 Using Rashid Ali’s brother, Kamal, the Iraqi envoy to 
Turkey as a go-between, Shawkat met with the German Minister, Franz von Papen.429 Shawkat told 
von Papen that he recognised the Middle East was within the Italian sphere of influence, as per the 
Axis agreement, but asked for Germany to restrain her and influence her decisions. In return for 
Italian restraint and removing the British Shawkat promised von Papen that the Iraqi Army would 
support Germany, German-Iraqi diplomatic relations would be normalised and the introduction of 
anti-Jewish laws in Iraq.430 However the Arabs would need public assurances from both Rome and 
Berlin that they would not be supplanting one imperialist power in the Middle East with another, 
just as the British and French had supplanted the Ottomans after the First World War. 
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Shortly after Shawkat met with von Papen in Turkey, Uthman Kamal Haddad, the Grand 
Mufti’s private secretary, met with Ernst von Weizsacker, the Secretary of State at the German 
Foreign Officer, and Grobba in Berlin in October 1940.431 Haddad claimed to speak on behalf of the 
Arab peoples as the Grand Mufti’s personal representative and said that a rebellion in Iraq could tie 
down 30-40,000 British troops and that the cost of the rebellion could be split between the Arabs, 
Germany and Italy with the weapons supplied via Vichy Syria.432 However like Shawkat, Haddad 
required public assurances from Germany and Italy, fearing that if not they would just be repeating 
the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Middle East between Britain and France. 433 
Public assurances came on 23 October 1940 in the form of the joint German-Italian 
Declaration, where they pledged their sympathy and support for the independence of the Arab 
peoples from their imperial masters.434 The British said that the declaration was vague propaganda 
designed to whip up the imagination of the Arab peoples to achieve German ends, as Churchill 
informed Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the new British Ambassador to Baghdad: 
 
What guarantee … except the armed forces of the British Empire is there  … against the 
incorporation of Palestine, Syria and Iraq, with her valuable oil, in an Italian colonial empire, 
where the Arab inhabitants would doubtless receive the same treatments as the Arabs in 
Libya? No declaration, no assurance by the German or Italian Governments can give Iraq 
security from such a fate. You can point out that the only country which had shown itself 
willing to maintain Iraqi independence is the UK, and that the true interests of Iraq obviously 
require a British victory.435 
 
Despite existing outside of Hitler’s world view, there were those in Berlin who saw the potential of 
the Arabs in their war against Britain. Ernst Woermann, the Under-Secretary of State at the German 
Foreign Office, published in March 1941 a memorandum where he spelled out his plans for using the 
Arabs against the British Empire. Woermann wanted the German Government to sever 
communications between India and the Mediterranean, deny strategic oilfields and keep the British 
Army occupied with internal policing as the Wehrmacht advanced on all fronts against them.436 A 
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few days later on 11 March Weizsacker sent a letter to the Grand Mufti stating that Germany 
recognised the complete independence of the Arab peoples and would help them attain it. 437 
Despite containing no concrete proposals, which unnerved many nationalists, the fifth 
column leaders believed that Germany was waiting for them to take the initiative. German 
propaganda broadcasts in Iraq were well received and in the wider war Britain was on the back foot 
as German forces swarmed across North Africa and through Yugoslavia and Greece.438 The fifth 
columnists had courted promises of German support, now they threw themselves into a coup 
unknowing if these promises would manifest into action. 
 
Baghdad Coup and the Anglo-Iraqi War 
In February 1941 the British received intelligence about a potential coup in Iraq involving Rashid Ali, 
the Golden Square and the Grand Mufti and that the plotters would appeal for German support via 
the Italian Legation in Baghdad.439 However the coup was not to come until 1 April when Rashid Ali 
assumed the premiership of Iraq with the Golden Square’s military support. 440 Two proclamations 
were issued in the days after the coup, the first by the Chief of the General Staff and the second by 
Rashid Ali. They stated that a Government of National Defence would be formed under Rashid Ali’s 
leadership and accused the Regent, Abd al-Ilah,441 of trying to install himself as King of Iraq with 
British help and that the Army acted in the interests of all Iraq.442 The Regent fled to Basra where 
Royal Navy warships and British troops maintained control of the vital seaport. 443 In the aftermath of 
the coup Cornwallis told London to expect a huge influx of Germans into Iraq who would help Rashid 
Ali secure his regime and facilitate the normalisation of relations with Germany, he also said that 
Iraq would now “fall rapidly to Nazi influence” and called for Rashid Ali’s overthrow. 444 After meeting 
with Musa Shabandar, Rashid Ali’s Foreign Minister, on 24 April Cornwallis reported that “this 
Government is obviously deeply committed to Germany.”445 
Despite launching a pro-German coup in Baghdad there is little evidence to suggest that the 
Germans were prepared for it. As Bullard informed Cornwallis of the reaction of Germans in Iran:  
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Our evidence suggests Germans here were taken by surprise by the coup d'état.446  
 
Iraq’s neighbours, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia were also taken by surprise by the coup with Şükrü 
Saracoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ibn Saud, the Saudi King and even some pro -German Iranian 
ministers all unhappy at the prospect of a pro-Nazi Iraq on their doorsteps.447 
British propaganda savagely attacked Rashid Ali, the Grand Mufti and the Golden Square. 
Alleging that he and the Grand Mufti were in Italian pay and that they cared only for themselves not 
for Iraq’s safety which they were endangering by openly agitating against the British Empire. 448 
Lampson took an even more belligerent tone, as was his style, and suggested the following be used 
in a propaganda broadcast: 
 
At this moment the people of Iraq are being ruled not constitutionally but by a gang of four 
generals and one ambitious politician, the generals … all are traitors to their country which 
they are bringing to the verge of war with Iraq’s oldest friend (Britain)  … The treacherous 
Rashid Ali has accepted both money and promises and he has been so effectively 
compromised by the Germans who are more than 1,000 miles away that he and the Golden 
Square have led out Iraq’s noble army and brought the peaceful country to war. People of 
Iraq your army is being led against the powerful British forces by the treachery of five 
men.449 
 
The British also drafted an address for the Regent of Iraq, against attacking the fifth columnists for 
the pain and suffering they were to bring down upon Iraq: 
 
A group of military tyrants brought by foreign gold have by force trust me from my sacred 
duties as guardian of my nephew your beloved King … Under their evil sway the noble land 
of Iraq had been poisoned by falsehood and lies and brought from the blessings of peace to 
the horrors of a venomous war.450 
 
Rashid Ali ordered Iraqi Army troops to surround the RAF base at Habbaniya in an attempt to 
intimidate the British after reinforcements landed at Basra. Hostilities began on 2 May when Air 
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Vice-Marshal Harry George Smart ordered a pre-emptive strike against Iraqi positions outside the 
base, and Royal Navy warships were ordered to fire on Iraqi forces. 451 
The Anglo-Iraqi War ended within the month on 31 May 1941 with the restoration of the 
Regent, after British forces rolled over the ill-disciplined, ill-trained and ill-equipped Iraqi Army that 
had only been ever used for internal security and not wars with an external power, let alone the 
Imperial military. Churchill was no Chamberlain; he was prepared to take ruthless action against the 
Iraqi fifth column and was not restrained by the niceties of peacetime. The Iraqi fifth column, whilst 
successful in seizing control of the Iraqi Government, was completely useless at their next primary 
concern, keeping control. They failed in this endeavour for two reasons. The first was that the British 
had learned from their mistakes in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland in regard to the dangers of 
fifth columns if they are allowed to go unchecked. Secondly, failure was the fault of the fifth 
column’s German sponsors, the coup came in between a string of successes in North Africa and 
South-Eastern Europe and preparations for a war against the USSR. Geographically isolated from the 
Wehrmacht and low on the list of priorities, the Iraqi fifth column, despite all the promises of 
support was to be left at Britain’s mercy by their purported German allies. 
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German Assistance – Too Little, Too Late 
On 6 May 1941 Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the UK Ambassador to Turkey, sent a telegram to 
Eden detailing a conversation a British source had with the German and Italian Military Attachés on 4 
May in Ankara: 
 
[Axis] officials were worried over the premature outbreak of trouble in Iraq. They realised 
that if they could not assist Iraq, they would lose prestige in the Arabic world, and also the 
possibility of obtaining the oilfields, also that only intervention by air could arrive in time, 
but this presented considerable technical difficulties.452 
 
This report from Turkey reveals the weaknesses of the Iraqi fifth column. They relied entirely on 
German support to be successful and at the time of hostilities with Britain that support would be 
slow, limited and of low priority for the Wehrmacht which was consumed by preparations for war 
with the USSR.  
Despite this Rashid Ali’s Government made open overtures to Berlin with Shawkat informing 
Saracoğlu whilst in Istanbul on 8 May that Baghdad only contacted the Germans after the 
commencing of hostilities and that they only desired normalised relations with Germany.453 In short 
Shawkat and the fifth columnists wanted to give the appearance that Berlin was coming to 
Baghdad’s rescue instead of plotting hand in glove against the British before the April coup. The 
British saw Shawkat for the go-between for the fifth columnists and the Germans that he was and 
saw his presence in Istanbul as a threat to British interests; Knatchbull -Hugessen lobbied Saracoğlu 
for Shawkat’s expulsion and he soon left Istanbul for Jeddah.454 In Jeddah Shawkat admitted to Ibn 
Saud that Germany agreed to send money, weapons and troops to assist Rashid Ali along with 
officers to train the Iraqi Army, and that Grobba, who had now arrived in Baghdad, and been 
empowered by Hitler to facilitate German aid to Iraq.455 
On 11 May it became apparent to the British that Luftwaffe aircraft were being despatched 
to Iraq to assist Rashid Ali. The British were worried that they would stiffen Iraqi resolve and alter 
the military balance in the country in Germany’s favour.456 Between 10 May, when Grobba returned 
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to Iraq, and 15 May a total of twenty-four Luftwaffe aircraft457 (two squadrons) arrived in Mosul led 
by Colonel Werner Junck.458 These warplanes fell far short of what Rashid Ali had asked of Berlin on 
28 April where he had told the Germans that he required ten Luftwaffe squadrons (120 aircraft), fifty 
armoured cars, hundreds of machine guns, dozens of heavy guns, 3 million bullets and £3 million a 
month.459 The Germans also pressured the Vichy authorities to despatch weapons from Syria to Iraq, 
a decision that would lead to the Allied invasion of Vichy Syria and Lebanon following the Anglo -Iraqi 
War, along with pitiful amount of £20,000 of gold with another £80,000 that only made it as far as 
Athens before the Iraqis were defeated.460 
Further German assurances of assistance came on 23 May when Hitler issued Directive 30 
where he publicly declared his support for German assistance to Iraqi fifth columnists:  
 
I have therefore decided to advance developments in the Middle East by giving support to 
Iraq. Whether and how the English position between the Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf shall in due course be finally destroyed, in connection with an offensive against the Suez 
Canal, will only be decided after Barbarossa.461 
 
Directive 30 symbolised the failures of German assistance to Iraq. They wanted to weaken the British 
in the Middle East and were prepared to send help, but their forces were tied up with preparations 
for the invasion of the USSR and until Moscow had fallen Baghdad was expected to fight the British 
alone. By 25 May the Germans were advising Rashid Ali to retreat from Baghdad to Mosul against 
the British advance and that due to supply shortages no further assistance would arrive for another 
two months.462 Amir Faisal, Ibn Saud’s son and Saudi Foreign Minister, reported to Hugh 
Stonehewer-Bird, UK Minister to Jeddah, that Saudi intelligence had learned that the Germans were 
incredibly angry with Iraqi military incompetence, poor intelligence, lack of fue l, inefficient pilots and 
mechanics and some said that Rashid Ali had deceived Berlin as to the state of his strength and 
preparedness for war with Britain.463 
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Lacking effective German support the weak and poorly led, equipped and trained Iraqi Army 
collapsed in the face of the might of the British Empire. Rashid Ali, the Golden Square, the Grand 
Mufti, Fritz Grobba the Italian Minister and thirty other Germans and Arabs fled across the Iranian 
border on 30 May 1941 with the Regent and Nuri al-Said returning to power on 31 May.464 The fifth 
column had been defeated and the British would maintain firm control of Iraq for the duration of the 
Second World War. 
 
Overview 
To conclude we must answer two questions: How were the British successful at countering the fift h 
column? And secondly, why was the fifth column method a failure in Iraq?  
The first question may be the easiest to answer: Britain at war did not face the same 
constraints as Britain at peace. If Britain had attempted to actively counter the Austrian and  
Czechoslovakian fifth columns they risked provoking a war with Germany. However by 1941 they 
were already at war with Germany and needn’t concern themselves with Germany’s reaction to 
their stifling of an ally. Churchill could afford to take the aggressive and ruthless decisions that 
Chamberlain couldn’t, and, some would argue, or be prepared to take. However, there is a 
secondary answer to this question: Being in a state of war meant that Britain could keep its 
objectives in Iraq simple and contained, whereas in peacetime there were numerous other 
diplomatic, military, economic and financial matters to take into account, Iraq posed a threat and 
Britain would neutralise it. A WO telegram from 7 May 1941 spells out Britain’s objectives in Iraq:  
 
Object is to safeguard ourselves against Axis intervention in Iraq. The methods to attaining it 
are twofold: A. To defeat and discredit the leaders of the armed forces in the eyes of the 
Army and people in hope of Rashid’s Government being replaced. B. To occupy key points to 
prevent Axis help, if sent, being effective.465 
 
In short, war allowed Britain to be far more Machiavellian in regards to those who posed any threat 
to her greater strategic interests. Their experiences in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had 
allowed them to identify Germany’s preference for utilising fifth columns, and they had identified 
the political and military elite in Baghdad that would serve as her pawns. When war finally broke out 
between Britain and Iraq the British were able to move quickly and efficiently to subject the fifth 
column leaders to sustained propaganda attacks as their military was destroyed by Empire forces.  
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   But why was the fifth column method unsuccessful in Iraq? They had followed the same formulae 
as the successful fifth columnists in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland: a political clique motivated 
by a pro-German ideology, in this case Arab nationalism, plans and executes a political coup to seize 
control of their host group and then invites assistance from their German sponsors to bring their 
host into the German fold.  
Warner, Cole, Hirszowicz, Tarbush, Simon and Eden lay most of the blame at Germany’s 
hesitation in providing assistance to Iraq but also recognise other factors. Simon argues that the 
Golden Square were “better politicians than soldiers” whose poor grasp of military affairs allowed 
the British to steamroll over the Iraqi Army with a vastly numerically inferior force. He is supported 
by Warner who places Iraqi military and political incompetence behind Ge rmany’s hesitation as 
reasoning for the fifth column’s failure.466 Eden, Hirszowicz and Tarbush recognised that Germany’s 
little and late assistance was due to having the bulk of the Wehrmacht engaged in preparations for 
Operation Barbarossa, and the bulk of the Luftwaffe entangled with the airborne invasion of Crete 
that began on 20 May 1941.467 Whilst Cole argues that the Germans were both too distant from Iraq 
to lend any effective help and were frankly uninterested in providing anything more than a token 
display of solidarity with the fifth columnists.468 Why waste resources on squabble in the Middle East 
when a struggle for the future of humanity with the Soviet Union lay only a few weeks away?  
To conclude it was Germany’s failure to lend effective and timely  assistance, Iraqi political 
and military incompetence and mismanagement and Britain’s quick, decisive and heavy -handed 
response to the crisis that accounted for the fifth column’s failure in Iraq. Immediately after Britain 
had secured its control of Iraq it laid its eyes on Vichy Syria and fought a short but bloody war with 
the Vichy French forces in response for Vichy involvement in the shipment of arms to Rashid Ali’s 
Government.469 Then Britain turned towards Iran where the Iraqi fifth columnists enjoyed the 
protection of a pro-German tyrant, Reza Shah Pahlavi, whom the British believed to be in bed with 
the Germans thanks to the activities of a sinister fifth column that purportedly grown under their 
very noses throughout Iran. 
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CHAPTER VI – IRAN 
“The Fifth Column Menace” 
 
I consider that Stalin is right in regarding the Fifth Column menace in Iran as an urgent 
problem which calls for immediate vigorous action before the German advance towards the 
Caucasus renders effective pressure impossible.470  
 
Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to Moscow, reported back to London in the weeks 
following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 in Operation Barbarossa. In the 
aftermath of Barbarossa London and Moscow, the world’s foremost capitalist and communist 
powers stood in alliance against a common enemy, Hitler’s fascism. Churchill and Stalin, two men 
who personally despised each other, each man believing the other to be the devil incarnate, put 
aside ideological differences and sought to wipe Nazism from the face of the earth. However they 
first had to deal with the initial onslaught of nearly four million Wehrmacht and Axis soldiers, the 
largest invasion force in history, that looked set to overwhelm and defeat the Soviet Union using the 
refined Blitzkrieg tactics that had delivered the Germans easy victories in Poland, Western Europe 
and the Balkans. The Red Army was collapsing on all fronts, surrendering vast swathes of land and 
losing millions of men,  but London and Moscow also saw a secondary threat to Soviet survival that 
had the potential to hamstring the Allied war effort not only in the USSR, but in the Middle East and 
India; that threat was Iran. Ruled by a tyrannical anti-British and anti-Soviet Shah who held strong 
pro-German sympathises, had invited thousands of Germans into his country and who afforded 
protection to the fifth column leaders who had fled Iraq, Britain and the Soviet Union could not 
tolerate this rogue state in their rear as they fought to hold off the advancing Germans. London and 
Moscow saw German fifth column pawns, provocateurs and parasites all over Iran, in its politics, civil 
service, military, finance and infrastructure fearing that they would facilitate a Wehrmacht advance 
over the Caucasus allowing the Germans to seize control of the oilfields of Baku, Iran, Iraq and the 
wider region. 
This chapter will examine the fifth column in Iran in five sections: First the personal rule of 
Reza Shah Pahlavi, how he governed Iran, his unsteady relations with Britain and the Soviet Union 
and his newly forged relations with the Third Reich. Secondly, British and Soviet interests in Iran, 
including the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, treaties Tehran had with London and Moscow, and Iran’s 
strategic geographical location. Third, the German community in Iran, specifically how powerful, 
influential and large it was, how it operated in Iran, if it could be considered a fifth column and 
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British paranoia concerning it. Fourth, other motivations that Britain and the USSR had to taking a 
hard line against Iran including the wider war, oil, strategy and Allied supplies to the Soviet Union via 
the Persian Corridor. Finally the Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran on 25 August 1941, the defeat and 
occupation of Iran with the overthrow of Reza Shah, and the reality of the German fifth column in 
Iran. 
 
Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi 
   Iran, or Persia as the nation was known before changing its name in 1935, was, as Churchill 
described, a “weak and ancient state”.471 Long past its glory days of ancient past the Persia of the 
early twentieth century was corrupt, dysfunctional, poorly lead, strife with internal division and 
rivalries, politically stifled and victim to foreign intrigue as the British and Russian Empires waged 
their invisible war for control of a buffer zone between British India to the south and Russian Central 
Asia and the Caucasus to the north. The ruling dynasty was the Qajars who presided over a series of 
weak and ineffective governments in Tehran that would rise and fall as political factions competed 
with one another in the Persian Parliament. Reza Shah, or Reza Khan as he was known before seizing 
the throne, was a Colonel in the elite Cossack Brigade of the Persian Army who engineered a coup in 
May 1921 that saw him become the de facto political leader of Iran as War Minister.472 Qajar Persia 
was an exhausted and ruined state and Reza Khan was seen as a modernising reformer who could 
transform the country into a strong, independent state which would stand up to British and Russian 
influence and intrigue.473 He secured his authority by supressing several tribal and region revolts, 
made himself Prime Minister in October 1923 and in December 1925 convinced Parliament to 
depose the Qajars and offer him the Imperial Crown as Shahinshah, the King of Kings.474 At his 
coronation on 25 April 1926 in an act of extreme vanity and symbolism he famously placed the 
Imperial Crown upon his own head in imitation of Napoleon Bonaparte’s coronation as Emperor of 
the French.475 
Reza Shah’s new dynasty was founded upon what Abrahamian called the three pillars, 
whereby authority was centralised through administration, regulation and domination with the 
Army, bureaucracy and court patronage constituting each pillar.476 Reza Shah expanded the Army 
from 40,000 to 127,000 men and equipped them with modern weapons, he created a civil service of 
90,000 administrators to replace the haphazard patchwork of tribal, religious, local and regional 
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authorities that had flourished under the Qajars and handed out land, money, offices and titles to 
loyal supporters to keep his throne secure.477  
Reza Shah’s rule often led to loggerheads with Britain and the Soviet Union (the issue of 
Reza Shah and British and Soviet interests in Iran will be discussed in the next section), the 
traditional foreign influences in Persia, whom he sought to counter by fostering close relations with 
Hitler’s Germany. Like many of the fifth columnists discussed in this discourse Reza Shah was 
attracted to the NSDAP’s rule of Germany, in particular how it reversed Germany’s economic 
fortunes, reasserted itself as a militarily powerful state and fostered a form of nationalism that many 
in the 1930s found to be extremely attractive. Regarding Hitler’s harsh stance against Bolshevism, in 
this respect is it important to remember that Iranian-Soviet border was over 1,000 miles long, and 
his apparent desire to stand up to the British Empire  made Iran an obvious friend of Germany. Reza 
Shah fostered trade with the Reich and by the beginning of 1939 over 41 percent of I ran’s foreign 
trade was with Germany.478 Reza Shah also invited hundreds of German technicians, engineers and 
businessmen to assist in his economic modernisation programme, that the German Government, 
which desired to undermine British and Soviet influence in Iran and the wider Middle East, eagerly 
obliged to send.479 It was to be these Germans, their families and the merchants, bankers, doctors, 
officers and advisors sent out with them, who were to form the final fifth column to be studied in 
this essay. The British, and later Soviets, came to see the German fifth column as a threat to their 
influence in Iran and the wider war effort against Germany; what Moscow and London were most 
concerned with was that the fifth column enjoyed the protection of Reza Shah and the Iranian State. 
 
British and Soviet Interests 
The British and Russian Empires had a long history of political intrigue and influence in Persia, which 
continued into the twentieth century with the formation of the USSR. Both London and Moscow 
sought to keep Persia as a friendly buffer zone between their respective domains and would support 
rival political and tribal factions within the country.480 The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention sought to 
formalise British and Russian spheres of influence over Persia wi th Russia in the north and Britain in 
the south with Tehran as a neutral buffer between them.481  
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The 1907 Convention led to a lull in tensions between the two powers. However the 1917 
Bolshevik Revolution reignited them with the Soviets declaring the 1907 Convention void and 
demanding an end of British influence in Persia.482 To counter the threat of Communism in Iran the 
British sought to force the Qajars to sign a new Anglo-Persian Treaty in 1919 which would have 
effectively turned Persia into a British Protectorate and hand political, economic, financial and 
military powers to Britain.483 The treaty was rejected due to popular outrage in Iran and the Soviet 
occupation of the northern province of Gilan in April 1920.484 With Britain held temporarily at bay 
the Qajars signed the Soviet-Persian Treaty in February 1921 that saw Soviet withdrawal from 
Gilan.485 Under the terms of the Treaty the USSR cancelled Iran’s debts to the former Tsarist regime 
and would respect Iran’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in return for the right to station Soviet 
troops in Iran if the country were ever to be used as a jumping off point for a third party to attack 
Iran.486 Reza Khan was one of the architects of the Treaty, ironically sowing the seeds for his own 
downfall twenty years later. 
British interest in Iran were primarily focused on Iran’s oil industry via the Anglo -Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) which was part owned by the British Government. The first oil concession was 
granted in 1901 to William Knox D’Arcy’s First Exploration Company whereby his company was given 
exclusive oil exploration, drilling, production and refining rights in southern Iran in exchange for 16 
percent of annual profits in royalties to Tehran along with £20,000 cash and £20,000 in shares to the 
Shah.487 First Exploration was brought out by the British Government in 1909 and became AIOC 
which built the world’s largest oil refinery at Abadan, Iraq on the Persian Gulf, making the AIOC a 
vital Imperial asset as in 1913 Royal Navy ships were converted from coal to oil.488 By 1939 the AIOC 
was the largest producer of Middle Eastern oil at 10 million tons a year. 489 The Knox D’Arcy 
Concession became a bone of contention between Britain and Reza Shah, as each side tried to 
exploit it for their own ends at the expense of the other. In November 1932, in an attempt to exert 
his power and degrade foreign influence in his country, Reza Shah cancelled the Concession and 
demanded a fairer renegotiated agreement.490 Resorting to Imperialist gunboat diplomacy the 
British conducted a major naval exercise in the Persian Gulf and pressured Reza Shah into reinstating 
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the Concession which he did in April 1933.491 The 1933 Concession upped the AIOC’s royalties to 
Tehran from 16 to 20 percent. However Iran was forced to concede more land, annul  its right to tax 
the AIOC, extend the concession by 32 years and effectively hand Iran’s oil industry to the AIOC. 492 
Oil was the main British Imperial interest in Iran, and London was prepared to do anything to protect 
it during their war with Hitler’s Germany. 
 
German Fifth Column in Iran and British Paranoia 
The German fifth column in Iran ostensibly existed to assist in the modernisation of Iran’s economy 
and to strengthen German-Iranian economic ties.493 However the British believed that economic 
links went hand in hand with political influence, and saw the German community as a 
political/military instrument wielded by the NSDAP, as there were Germans in positions of power 
and influence throughout Iran’s economic, transportation, finance and military agencies.494 Rashid 
Ali’s coup in Iraq, which was supported by German agents from Iran, convinced the British that the 
German community was a fifth column, as it had been in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig, and the 
economic justification for their presence in Iran was a cover that the Iranian Government was parlay 
to.495 The British counted 117 Germans to have illegally crossed the Iraqi -Iranian border during the 
Iraqi Rebellion and believed that the German Legation in Tehran was the hub of fifth column 
activities in the Middle East.496 Reza Shah’s protection of the exiled Iraqi rebels and Rashid Ali’s 
contacts with the German Legation in Tehran seemingly confirmed to the British their suspicions 
about the German community, that they had sponsored the Iraqi Rebellion and had convinced the 
Iranian Government to shelter their fifth columnists.497 Britain became extremely paranoid about the 
fifth column’s intentions in Iran, believing that they would convince Reza Shah to join the Axis, 
launch a coup and place a puppet on the throne, instigate tribal uprisings, conduct a campaign of 
terrorism and sabotage and facilitate a German invasion via the Caucasus.498 Sir Reader Bullard, the 
British Minister to Tehran, believed the fifth column in Iran would not repeat the mistakes of Rashid 
Ali and the Golden Square by playing their hand with the Wehrmacht so far away and would instead 
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wait for the USSR to collapse and Wehrmacht reinforcements arrive over the Caucasus, giving Britain 
time to move against the fifth column before it could strike.499 
The British Government estimated the total size of the German community in Iran to be 
3,000 individuals of whom 1,000 were military aged males of which a communiqué to the US 
Government declared: 
 
More important than their number is the fact that most of these men occupy key positions 
throughout the country. They are highly organised and act as centres of propaganda. In the 
event of Germany being in a position to launch an attack their role would obviously be more 
active. No other foreign community has anything like the same position and influence. 500 
 
Moscow, determined to discredit the Germans in Iran after Barbarossa, declared that the German 
community numbered between 5,000 and 10,000, however the British privately doubted this.501 
British and Soviet paranoia was compounded by the presence of Abwehr agents in Iran, who in one 
instance arrived with briefcases filled with US Dollars, and Wehrmacht officers advising the Iranian 
military and reorganising it on the model of the Wehrmacht.502 Working together London and 
Moscow pressured the Iranian Government to both restrict the influence of the German community 
and the expel individuals who were surplus to Iran’s economic modernisation. Bullard and the Soviet 
Ambassador to Tehran, Andre Smirnoff, composed joint memoranda to Tehran,503 warning them of 
the danger posed by the fifth column and encouraging Iran to take measures against it, stating:  
 
There can indeed be no doubt, in the view of what has happened in many countries, that  
these persons will be employed, whenever it may seem to the German Government that the 
appropriate time has arrived, to create disorder, either in Iran herself or in neighbouring 
countries, with a view to assist the execution of Germany’s military plans. 504 
 
Tehran attempted to reassure London and Moscow that they were taking the threat of the fifth 
column seriously. An example of these reassurances can be found in a report from Cripps, who 
reported on a conversation with the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow: 
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He assured me again and again that they would not allow the Germans to create any 
trouble, but I pointed out that quite a lot of other countries had said the same thing, but had 
afterwards found that fifth column activities had overwhelmed them. He replied that they 
were an Eastern race and they could and would cut off all German heads if there was 
trouble.505 
 
Despite these public assurances Tehran took little to no action against the German community. 506 
Only 30 Germans had left Iran within three weeks of the second Anglo-Soviet Memorandum on 19 
July 1941, which, if it were to continue at that rate, meant all 3,000 Germans would take two years 
to leave the country.507 The Iranians justified this slow rate of expulsion as a ploy not to instigate 
German anger and not to be appearing to be buckling to British and Soviet pressure.508 By 23 August 
1941 British and Soviet patience with Iran’s failure to take any action against the German fifth 
column snapped and a decision was made to invade the country on 25 August. In a memorandum to 
the US Government, to keep the Americans informed on Allied policy towards Iran, the British 
explained their justifications for taking military action. They claimed that the excessive number of 
Germans posed a threat to British and Soviet interests, that the Iranians had failed to take 
satisfactory measures against them, that via the fifth column and the German Legation Berlin was 
encouraging Tehran to “drag their heels”, and that Reza Shah and his Government believed the 
Wehrmacht would be victorious against the Red Army: 
 
In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government find 
themselves obliged to have recourse to other measures to deal with the menace arising 
from the activities of enemy agents in Persia.509 
 
The British were not going to make the same mistake as they had made in every other example cited 
in this discourse. In Iraq they had been fortunate that the fifth column had received no support from 
the Wehrmacht and had been countered quickly before it could do serious damage to British 
interests. Now in Iran they were going to nip the threat in the bud, regardless of the potential 
magnitude of the actual threat the 3,000 Germans posed. 
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   Realpolitik – War, Oil, Strategy and the Persian Corridor 
The case of the fifth column in Iran not only takes place within the paradigm of the Second World 
War but also within the context that Germany is not only at war with Britain, as was the case during 
the Iraq Rebellion, but is also at war with the Soviet Union. In August 1941 Germany looked to be on 
the cusp of victory against the USSR as the Red Army collapsed on all fronts in the face of the 
blitzkrieg onslaught and Britain knew that if the Soviet Union was defeated then Hitler would turn 
his full attention towards Britain and the Empire. Britain needed time to rearm, reorganise and 
recover from the defeats of 1940 and early 1941, therefore it was paramount to keep the USSR 
fighting Germany in the form of military and economic supplies and ensuring that no hostile 
elements could hamstring her from behind. In this regard Iran became not only an issue of 
eliminating the fifth column but also reflected the realities of the wider war which London and 
Moscow kept secret from their people, their allies and the Iranian Government. 
There were two possible routes by which Britain could keep the Soviet Union supplied with 
materials and foodstuffs. Loading supplies onto ships and sending them round the Arctic to the 
northern Russian ports of Murmansk and Archangel was the first route. However this was fraught 
with dangers and difficulties as it meant the Arctic Convoys had to pass by German occupied Norway 
where they were subject to Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine attack and the sub-zero conditions threated 
the ships and crews of the convoys themselves.510 The second route was for supplies from Iraq and 
India and the Far Eastern Empire to travel overland through Iran on road and rail links in what 
became known as the Persian Corridor.511 It was Moscow which first proposed the notion of 
supplying the southern front through Iran on 29 June, just one week after Barbarossa, and they 
requested British help in achieving this.512 Desperate for supplies and “unduly optimistic” Moscow 
outlined the first route from Nokkundi, in British India, to Meshed near the Iranian-Soviet border 
which they planned to develop to carry 2,000 tons a months on 100 5-ton lorries with a seven day 
turnaround.513 The British calculated that if the Nokkundi-Meshed route was to be developed to 
2,000 tons a month then 300 lorries would be required, which they believed should be British, not 
Soviet, controlled in case the USSR surrendered to Germany and the lorries, and supplies, fell into 
German hands.514 To expand the Persian Corridor’s capacity several ports on the Persi an Gulf, both 
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Iranian and Iraqi, with serviceable rail links, were identified and formulated into British plans. 515 The 
issue of the Persian Corridor to supply the USSR was never admitted to in London’s and Moscow’s 
demarches to Tehran which only focused on the German community with a committee report 
hinting that the issue of the fifth column was being used as a smokescreen to hide their true 
intentions: 
 
It is a pity that the activities of the Germans in Persia have been singled out as the only issue 
in regard to which we are at present prepared to apply the screw.516 
 
The defence of India and Turkey was also a contributing factor in British and Soviet minds for 
intervention in Iran. India was the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire and many in the British 
and Indian Governments saw it as essential to the Empire’s survival; the potential of having a hostile 
Iran on its border threatened to bring the Axis powers right up to the Empire’s heartland. 517 In mid-
July Sir Archibald Wavell, the new Commander-in-Chief India, wrote of Iran: 
 
The most important [step] is immediate action to eliminate the Germans from Iran and to 
arrange for cooperation with the Russians in that area to block the advance of the Germans 
towards India either from the Caucasus or Turkey. Failure to action against the Fifth Column 
will allow German penetration right up to the Indian border.518 
 
Wavell urged immediate action against Iran before the international situation deteriorated any 
further, not only in regards to Barbarossa but also the souring relations with Japan which looked set 
to enter the war within the coming months.519 Wavell’s reasoning for this was that India’s defences 
were weak, with “practically non-existent” anti-aircraft or anti-tank defences, no modern aircraft 
and poor artillery. Therefore it was necessary to neutralise any potential threat Iran might pose to 
buy time to upgrade India’s defences before Japan entered the war. 520 
In regards to Turkey, Britain, saw the neutralisation of a hostile Iran as essential to her 
defence and continued neutrality. Turkey bordered both Axis and Allied territories, but remained 
fiercely neutral with a powerful, modern military to defend her, and her painful experience of being 
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on the losing side of the First World War to dampen any appetite for joining the Second.521 If Iran 
were to join the Axis camp either by coup or by choice then Turkey would be bookended by 
Germany and her allies in both east and west.522 Britain and the USSR both sent joint assurances to 
Turkey that their actions against Iran were designed to protect Turkish neutrality, and that they 
weren’t trying to push Turkey into war with Germany or anyone else, and that neither power had 
designs on Turkish territory, in particular the strategic Bosphorus Straits, that were the object of 
Tsarist Russian designs in the First World War.523 London was so desperate to keep Turkey in the 
loop, that the Turks were informed of the contents of the final joint memorandum to Tehran, dated 
16 August, two days before it was presented to the Iranian Government.524 
Finally no discussion on the strategic importance of Iran would be complete without oil. As 
previously mentioned, the AIOC was Britain’s main Imperial asset in Iran and the Abadan Refinery 
was essential to the Imperial war effort. The AIOC’s  twenty percent royalty to the Iranian 
Government constituted Reza Shah’s primary source of revenue. His modernisation programme, 
which included excessive military and industrial spending, had increased Iran’s financial deficit 
tenfold between 1940 and 1941.525 In a bid to increase his revenue Reza Shah began demanding 
further concessions from the AIOC, including a £1.5 million additional flat rate to be added to the 
royalty.526 Not only did this infuriate the British but it also unnerved them regarding Reza Shah’s 
intentions towards the AIOC with Eden even suspecting that Reza Shah may attack, destroy, or, even 
worse in British eyes, nationalise the Iranian oilfields as leverage against Britain. 527 There was also 
the rationale of protecting the AIOC from the Germans, both the fifth column and the Wehrmacht, 
who looked poised to defeat the Red Army and enter Iran via the Caucasus. It was well known and 
understood that Germany lacked major oil supplies and that she needed to capture British and 
Soviet-controlled oilfields in the Caucasus and Middle East .528 By taking military action in Iran, Britain 
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could not only secure and guarantee the defence of the AIOC oilfields, but also be in a position to 
either destroy or occupy the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus in the event of a Soviet defeat.529  
It would be these secret issues – the Persian Corridor, the wider war and strategy, and oil – 
that Britain and the Soviet Union came to their decision to jointly invade Iran on 25 August 1941. The 
3,000 strong German fifth column would serve as the public justification for their actions, regardless 
of whether it actually posed a threat or even was a genuine fifth column.  
 
Invasion and the Damp Squib 
On 25 August 1941 Great Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran, the British and Empire forces 
from the south west over the Iraqi border, and the Red Army from the north over the Caucasus. 
Both London and Moscow knew that the Iranian military would not be able to withstand their 
overwhelming combined might, confident that the Iranians would only offer token resistance.530 The 
Iranian Army boasted just over 126,000 men but they lacked training, discipline and heavy artillery 
equipment, despite Reza Shah’s spending sprees.531 British military planning made securing the 
oilfields a top priority, further evidence that the removal of the German fifth column was a 
convenient excuse for military action rather than the primary objective, and stressed the need to be 
seen working in conjunction with the Soviets.532 
To convince the Iranian people Britain and the USSR dropped propaganda leaflets across Iran 
justifying themselves. They claimed to be ridding the people of a corrupt and tyrannical Shah, who 
had abused his power to amass private wealth at the expense of his subjects, driven the Iranian 
economy into the ground, made an unholy alliance with Nazi Germany which cared nothing for Iran 
and only sought to exploit its people and resources.533 Their propaganda leaflets also ended with a 
very stark warning to any who thought of resisting the joint Allied invasion: 
 
But if any oppose us or help the Germans [they] will be destroyed. 534 
 
The Iranian Army collapsed faster and harder than expected in the face of the Imperial and Red 
Armies. No fortifications had been erected, soldiers hadn’t been trained how to use their new 
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weapons, no supply arrangements had been made, the footsoldiers were both underfed and 
underpaid, no anti-aircraft defences were in place and the senior officers were on the whole corrupt 
and useless in the face of disciplined and determined Soviet and Empire troops, all resulting in mass 
desertions.535 By 28 August Reza Shah had ordered a ceasefire and armistice terms were offered to 
him. The first demand was for all German and Italian nationals to be handed over to the Allied 
powers, giving the veneer that the main objective of the invasion was to remove the German fifth 
column.536 Then Britain and the USSR demanded the right to station troops anywhere in Iran, to 
secure its oilfields and communications routes that they had the right to improve, and for Iran to 
terminate all diplomatic, commercial and civil relations with Germany and Italy. 537 Reza Shah was 
slow in implementing the demands and delayed in handing over the 3,000 Germans to the British 
and Soviets. In response their armies jointly marched on Tehran, Reza Shah abdicated on 16 
September, and Empire and Soviet troops occupied the capital the following day. 538 Reza Shah’s son, 
Mohammed Reza Shah, assumed the Iranian throne and agreed to the armistice terms.  In an 
intelligence report, written after the invasion and occupation, Mohammed Reza Shah is described in 
the following terms, hinting that the issue of the German fifth column was not Britain’s only issue 
when the decision to invade was made and instead sought to remove an uncooperative leader and 
install a more cooperative, almost puppet, in his place: 
 
Estimates of the young Shah’s character vary considerably. He apparently maintained close 
relations with the German Legation, but this may have been politic. He is not credited with 
much strength of character, which if true suit present circumstances. It would be unwise to 
assume that he will inevitably be a bad sovereign. In any case, no alternative presented 
itself, nor could any have been without considerable delay and a welter of intrigue. The 
present Shah, if unsuitable, can be got rid of later. In the meantime it should be possible to 
prevent him from doing much harm.539 
 
As stated numerous times throughout this chapter, Britain and the Soviet Union both used the issue 
of the German fifth column to justify their invasion of Iran. The German Minister to Tehran left Iran 
for Germany on 17 September, along with his family and dozens of German women and children 
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whose husbands and fathers had been detained by the occupation forces. 540 According to both 
nations, the German Legation in Tehran had been the beating heart of the fifth column, and the 
Minister’s fleeing was interpreted by some contemporaries as evidence that the fifth column was 
indeed coordinated from the Legation. However this is a false equivalency and his flight to Germany 
was a matter of diplomatic protocol.541 In the days and weeks following the invasion most of the 
remaining Germans in Iran had been detained, those who were luckily enough to be arrested by the 
British were deported to India; those unluckily enough to fall into Soviet hands faced the gulags of 
Siberia and potential death. It was during this period that the British admitted to themselves the 
truth about the German fifth column, that it simply did not exist anywhere near the scale that they 
had spoken of both publicly and privately: 
 
German fifth column activities do not seem to have been so well organised as they might 
have been. Numerous opportunities for sabotage must have occurred in the confusion of 
the first few days after the invasion, but no advantage was taken of them. The motive 
inspiring the Germany colony in Tabriz was certainly to escape from the Russians with 
maximum speed.542 
 
The German fifth column had been a damp squib, a charade, a convenient excuse for aggressive 
military action against a neutral sovereign state. A way for Britain to justify occupying the oilfields 
and installing military fortification around the refinery at Abadan, for military supplies to reach the 
Soviet Union to keep the Soviets fighting the Nazis, so an irksome leader who had continually 
annoyed, infuriated and agitated the British could be removed and a more pliable one installed in his 
place, so Britain and Russia could maintain their century old spheres of influence in Iran.  
 
Overview 
Iran in 1941 was not pre-war Austria, Czechoslovakia or Danzig, nor was it pre-Barbarossa Iraq of 
earlier that year. Iran in 1941 was a pawn in the game between the clash of titans that began on 22 
June with Operation Barbarossa. Iran in 1941 was claimed to be gilded with Axis gold and a hotbed 
of German subversive activity in the Middle East that had sponsored a rebellion in Iraq and 
threatened to destroy the Soviet Union and British Empire through devious and underhand means. 
This was not true. Iran in 1941 was the anvil and Britain was now the hammer. For years German 
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fifth column movements had undermined and outwitted the British Government time and time 
again, playing into Hitler’s hands and granting him more power and success. Britain had learned to 
fear and distrust any group of Germans living outside Germany (and especially those within it) and 
paranoia and xenophobia took over many minds in London when it came to the 3,000 Germans in 
Iran given past experience. There may have been a few Abwehr officers within the community, along 
with NSDAP officials and military advisors, but that does not mean the entire population was part of 
a fifth column plot to deliver Iran into the German fold, as had happened numerous times before. 
Rather the German community was a means to an end, not for Berlin, but for London and 
Moscow.543 
 
  
                                                                 
543 For further reading on the Anglo-Soviet invasion  and occupation of Iran refer to, E.C. Hodgkin, (ed.), 
Bullard, R., Letters from Tehran: A British Ambassador in World War II Persia  (London, 1991), J. Beaumont, 
‘Great Britain and the Rights of Neutral Countries: The Case of Iran, 1941’, Journal of Contemporary History, 16 
(1981), pp.213-228, and F. Eshraghi, ‘Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran’, Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (1984), 
pp.27-52. 
Cartoon depicting British and Soviet soldiers ‘cleaning up’ Iran (labelled as Persia) of German fifth 
columnists, drawn as flies and labelled as ‘Nazi tourists’, a caricature of Reza Shah sits in the foreground 
like a sulking child. ‘A good clean up’, By Sidney ‘George’ Strube, The Daily Express, 28 August 1941. 
Source, A Cartoon History of the Middle East, 
http://mideastcartoonhistory.com/1941To52/1941to52B.html  Accessed 29 October 2015. 
Pawns, Provocateurs and Parasites 
 
109 
 
CONCLUSION 
“A State of Coma” 
 
Hitler needs to reassure his foreign enemies into such a state of coma that they will allow 
themselves to be engaged one by one.544 
 
This prescient warning came from Sir Horace Rumbold the UK Ambassador to Berlin in late April 
1933 three months after Hitler gained power in Germany as Chancellor. What can be discerned from 
Rumbold’s warnings to the British Government is that it was known  to London that Berlin wanted to 
commit to an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy however it currently lacked the military 
means to enact it. In 1933 Germany was still militarily weak and encircled by powerful enemies 
including France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and it did not want to provoke the ire of Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union. Therefore Germany would have to resort to more devious and 
intelligent methods to pursue its foreign policy to bring all Germans into a single Reich and then to 
create a German Empire at the expense of her neighbours and enemies. One of the most effective 
weapons Hitler had at his disposal was the German fifth column movements and organisations that 
were spread throughout Europe and, later on, in the Middle East. These fifth columns would be used 
to undermine and ultimately overthrow Germany’s foreign enemies, making way for the Wehrmacht 
to march across their borders with little or no resistance offered, whilst Germany diplomacy, 
statecraft, propaganda and outright lies would be utilised to reassure more powerful countries, like 
Britain, that Germany’s European designs were wholly concentrated on correcting the injustices of 
the Treaty of Versailles. An argument that Germany pursued until March 1939 when it absorbed the 
non-German Czech population of Bohemia and Moravia into the Third Reich.  
Germany’s first use of one of its fifth column movements in Austria, during 1934, was 
without doubt a disaster. The Austrian Nazis terrorist tactics were easily foiled by a united Austrian 
Government, despite their assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, and the putsch was quickly quashed. 
All the Nazis had achieved in 1934 was alienating themselves from the Austrian populace, see many 
of their Austrian members either arrested, exiled or executed, making an enemy out of Mussolini’s 
Italy and creating the perfect environment for Britain, France and Italy to join in unison against 
Germany in the guise of the Stresa Front. If it were not for Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 
October 1935 which not only created fractures and divisions within the Austrian Government but 
also in the Stresa Front, it is open to speculation whether or not Nazi Germany would have 
attempted to pursue its foreign policy as aggressively as it did. It is rather down to Italian imperialism 
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and dreams (or delusions) of grandeur than German greatness that both the Stresa Front and 
Austrian Government fractured when they did, creating a fresh breeding ground for a second fifth 
column to gestate within Austria that ultimately succeeded in March 1938, through the use of 
political manipulation rather than violence and terrorism. 
The Austrian fifth column had proved to Berlin that by playing a cleverer game, and 
participating within the existing political system of their host countries, the Nazis would be far more 
effective in achieving their ambitions. In the Sudetenland, Slovakia and the Free City of Danzig, these 
would be used with, what was to many, including the British Government, shocking success.  
In the Sudetenland, the Nazis used a front organisation, the SdP, in a similar fashion to how 
a criminal organisation would use legitimate businesses to mask their illegal activities. By ratcheting 
up diplomatic pressure on the Czechoslovak Government in Prague, Berli n was able to provide the 
SdP a free hand within the Sudetenland, allowing them to unite the Sudeten German parties under 
their banner which allowed them to exert huge influence within the Czechoslovak State. Berlin kept 
Britain at bay by painting the situation of the Sudeten Germans within Czechoslovakia as a legitimate 
grievance from Versailles that required revision. Britain, in turn, was unwilling to risk war with 
Germany over the Sudetenland, as their rearmament programme lagged sorely behind Germany’s, 
and opted to find a face-saving solution that would buy them time to rearm at the expense of 
Czechoslovakia. In September 1938, at the Munich Conference, Britain and France willingly 
surrendered the Sudetenland to Germany, without even consulting the Cze choslovak Government, 
as the SdP and their Nazi sponsors had gained the momentum that both London and Prague were 
unable to contain or withstand.  
Six months later in Slovakia, the German sponsored Slovak nationalist HSLS engineered a 
second political crisis within Czechoslovakia that brought an end to the Czechoslovak State, saw 
Slovakia become an independent nation under German ‘protection’ and the Czech majority 
provinces of Bohemia and Moravia be annexed by the Wehrmacht without a shot being fired. By 
using non-German provocateurs in the form of the HSLS, Germany was able to publicly distance itself 
somewhat from the crisis, lulling Britain into a false perspective of the reality of the situation. This 
meant that by the time Britain understood the implications of the Slovak crisis, Germany had already 
occupied Bohemia and Moravia and placed Slovakia under their protection. Britain was now 
determined not be caught short by German duplicity and deception again, as the occupation of 
Bohemia and Moravia had violated Germany’s promise at Munich that the Sudetenland was their 
last territorial demand in Europe. In the wake of the demise of Czechoslovakia Britain signed a 
guarantee with Poland that meant if Germany threatened Polish sovereignty or integrity then there 
would be war between them. 
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To many it was obvious that Poland would become the next target of German aggression; by 
1939 the Wehrmacht was far larger and better equipped than it was when the Nazis seized power in 
1933 leaving the Polish army both numerically and technologically inferior. What many did not 
realise was that Warsaw would not become the focus of Germany’s attentions but rather the Free 
City of Danzig, which operated under the auspices of the League of Nations. The Nazi Party in Danzig 
had operated freely and effectively in the Free City as part of the democratic process and took 
power in their own right via open elections in the aftermath of the NSDAP’s victory in Germany. The 
Danzig Nazis were able to avoid British suspicion and interference by keeping the façade of 
democracy and the League of Nations in place in Danzig, whilst amassing dictatorial powers behind 
the scenes that they only utilised when Germany was in a position of strength to deter any British 
attempts at diplomatic, economic or military intervention in the Free City. In a similar fashion to the 
Austrian Nazis, the Sudeten German Party and the Slovak Nationalists, the Danzig Nazis were able to 
engineer a political crisis with Poland that Germany used as justification for occupying Danzig and 
invading Poland. However what Germany did not expect was for Britain to stand by its guarantee to 
Poland and, with France, declare war on Germany, beginning the Second World War.  
1938 to 1939 were the heydays of German fifth column successes, which had been utilised 
in conjunction with German diplomatic spin and threats of German military violence to expand the 
Nazi Empire into four sovereign states within mere months of each other. In that time Britain had 
been eased into a state of coma not only by German statecraft but also by its own eagerness to 
avoid war with Germany at almost any cost. However, unlike the case of Czechoslovakia, Britain 
meant to stand by its guarantee to Poland and after Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as Prime 
Minister in May 1940, continued and escalated the war against Germany and her Axis allies. If 
Chamberlain was Britain being eased into the coma then Churchill was Britain's awakening. No 
longer facing the same political, diplomatic, economic, or even moral and l egal, constraints as 
Chamberlain, Churchill was able to take an aggressive and overwhelmingly violent approach to the 
German fifth column problem. This was the case with both Iraq and Iran in 1941 which faced the full, 
blunt force of the British Empire in the midst of the Second World War. 
The Iraq Rebellion and ensuing Anglo-Iraqi War was spurred on by non-German fifth 
columnists in the form of anti-British Iraqi nationalists spearheaded by religious zealots, the Iraqi 
military elite and their political stooges. With promises of German military support the Iraqi 
nationalists launched their rebellion against the pro-British government in Baghdad and established 
a pro-German regime. However Churchill’s Britain was not prepared to allow these men to threaten 
Britain’s strategic position in the Middle East that was already threatened by German successes in 
North Africa and Greece, leading to a swift and decisive response. German promises of meaningful 
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military support for their Iraqi pawns failed to materialise and Iraq’s geographical isolation from the 
Wehrmacht meant that support would not be swift in coming, resulting in the rebellion’s defeat and 
the reassertion of British dominance over Iraq. The Iraqi Rebellion had seemingly confirmed British 
suspicions that German fifth columns were not just confined to Europe, either in the form of German 
populations or historical German influences and modern political sympathies, and that they existed 
outside Europe in territories that the British saw as either part of their dominion or within their 
sphere of influence. The British had become paranoid about the prospect of other German fifth 
columns wreaking havoc behind the front lines and they were prepared to let their paranoia guide 
their hearts and minds in the wake of Operation Barbarossa. 
The German invasion of the Soviet Union can be marked as one of the two points that the 
Second World War truly became a world war, the second being the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour on 7 December 1941. Barbarossa saw Britain employ the policy of ‘the enemy of my enemy 
is my friend’ despite Britain and the Soviet Union’s hatred of one another, and the two powers saw it 
as necessary to join forces to destroy Nazism before it overwhelmed them both. Reza Shah’s Iran 
was a thorn in their collective side, having played off British and Soviet interests against each other 
before drawing closer to Hitler’s Germany. London and Moscow were determined to remove any 
potential threat his regime might pose to them, and achieve other secret strategic war aims. Guided 
by their paranoia of German fifth columns, given past experience, and allowing it to conveniently 
cloud their vision as to the realities of the situation in Iran the 3,000 strong German community in 
Iran were to provide London with the perfect scapegoat. Britain and the USSR jointly invaded Iran, 
forced Reza Shah to abdicate, placed his weak-willed son on the throne and occupied Iran’s strategic 
communications systems and oilfields. The German fifth column transpired to be nothing more than 
a shadow of the fifth columns that Germany had employed with dazzling success in pre -war Europe. 
Rather the potential for a fifth column served as the legitimising excuse for Britain’s “naked 
aggression” against Iran rather than the practical reason for it.545 
The German fifth column movements of 1934 to 1941 were varying in terms of their 
structure, leadership, methods and degrees of success. However they all existed as pawns, 
provocateurs and parasites within their hosts at the direction of their sponsors in Berlin and all 
sought to undermine their hosts to the advantage of their sponsor. They were used so successfully 
that only direct military intervention by the British in Iraq and Iran were capable of preventing them 
from committing their German master’s orders. In short Britain had to resort to disproportionate 
and extreme violence to counter them. This resort to violence shows how little Britain understood 
about these fifth columns, about how they operated, how they were formed and directed, and 
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perhaps most importantly why people became fifth columnists in the first place. All Britain 
understood of these organisations was that they were a direct and deadly threat to their interests 
and that they must be countered regardless of the reality of the threat; like using a sledgehammer to 
squash an ant, effective but without understanding, proportionality or second thought to what gets 
squashed alongside it. 
Britain’s attitude towards German fifth column movements by 1941 can best be described 
by Sir Nevile Bland, who was quoted at the beginning of this discourse: 
 
Every German or Austrian servant, however superficially charming and devoted, is a real and 
grave menace, and we cannot conclude from our experiences in the last war that ‘the enemy 
in our midst’ is no more dangerous than it was then. I have not the least doubt that, when 
the signal is given, as it will scarcely fail to be when Hitler so decides, there will be satellites 
of the monster all over the country who will at once embark on widespread sabotage attacks 
on civilians and the military indiscriminately.546 
   
 The German fifth columns may have been pawns, provocateurs and parasites but the British 
understanding of them was guided by lies, paranoia, xenophobia, imperialist arrogance and cold 
political realism that allowed them to be used so successfully in Europe and so disastrously in the 
Middle East. 
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